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I.
INTRODUCTION
Due process of law embodies substantive rights and procedural guarantees that protect a
person from the arbitrary and capricious acts of his or her government. These rights include life,
liberty, and security of person; recognition before the law and equal protection of the law;
freedom from arbitrary arrest and detention; freedom from torture and cruel inhumane, and
degrading treatment or punishment ; presumption of innocence; and fair trial. There are currently
numerous international human rights instruments that afford every individual these rights, such
as the American Convention on Human Rights, Inter-American Convention to Prevent and
Punish Torture, International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, and Convention Against
Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, and Degrading Treatment or Punishment. Peru’s past is
filled with horrific stories of violence involving terrorism and the violent reaction to terrorism by
its government, especially after the April 5, 1992, coup-d-‘etat. Peru is slowly coming out of its
tragic past. Currently, in its war on terror, Peru is making substantial progress in improving its
human rights record, but in some important respects she falls short of her obligations under
international human rights norms.
During the reign of President Alberto Fujimori, core due process rights, which were
previously protected by the Constitution, were obliterated in the arrest, prosecution and
sentencing of alleged terrorists. Under the anti-terrorism laws and numerous presidential
decrees, persons arrested for alleged terrorist activities were tortured, interrogated, forced to
confess, and then tried in closed military trials presided by hooded or faceless judges and
prosecutors. Since Fujimori’s removal from office, the Peruvian Constitutional Court and the

1

Inter-American Court of Human Rights, have directed Peru to alter its judicial system and reform
its anti-terrorism laws. Some legislative changes were eventually made in 2003.
This report analyzes the 1992 terrorism law which caused the detentions, arrests,
interrogations, trials and the sentencing of many Peruvians and some foreigners and the
disappearances and murder of many other individuals. This report also discusses the decision of
the Peruvian Constitutional Court, which was prompted by the rulings of the Inter-American
Court of Human Rights (IACHR), and the subsequent legislative changes Peru made to its antiterrorism law in 2003. The report will also evaluate Peru’s anti-terrorism laws and procedures
against international human rights standards that bind Peru outside the Inter-American human
rights system.
II.
PERU’S ANTI-TERRORISM LAWS
In a report concerning "Terrorism and Human Rights", the Inter-American Commission
on Human Rights recognized that States have criminalized terrorism in one of two ways: some
have chosen to prescribe a specific crime of terrorism based on commonly identifiable
characteristics of terrorist violence, while others, instead of prescribing terrorism as a separate
crime, have added to existing and well-defined common crimes, such as murder, a terrorist
intent, and increased the punishment for the crime depending on the severity of the terrorist
violence. 1
In Peru, as early as 1981, terrorism was criminalized in the following terms:
Those who, with the goal of provoking or maintaining an state of
anxiety, alarm or fear among the population or part of it,
committed acts that may endanger life, health or patrimony, or that
are directed to destroy or damage public buildings, means of
communication or transportation, using methods capable of
1

Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, “Report on Terrorism and Human Rights”, October 2002.
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provoking major havoc, or seriously disturbing public peace, or
affecting international relations or the security of the state, will be
punished with imprisonment for no less than ten and no more than
twenty years. 2
Subsequent Peruvian laws eliminated reference to the actor’s intent and punished the
objective result instead. Terrorism was classified as an “offense of danger” that punishes an act
for the likely harm that it will produce.
On April 5, 1992, then Peruvian President Alberto Fujimori restructured the Peruvian
government. 3 As a result, the 1979 Constitution of Peru was replaced by a new Constitution,
which was ratified in 1993, giving the President power to issue decrees, having the force of law. 4
In response to increased terrorist attacks, President Fujimori issued Decree Law 25475
(hereinafter DL 25475) to prosecute terrorism. 5 The law included guidelines for the arrest,
detention, investigation, trial and sentencing of persons accused of acts of terrorism. 6
A.

1992 Decrees
1.

Definition of Terrorism
a.

Decree Law 25475, Article 2 – Definition of Terrorism

Article 2 of DL 25475 defined the crime of terrorism as an act that:
provokes, creates, or maintains a state of anxiety, alarm, or fear in the population
or in a sector thereof, performs acts against life, the body, health, personal liberty
and security, or against property, against the security of public buildings, roads, or
means of communication or of transport of any type, energy or explosive
materials or artifacts, or any other means capable of causing damage or grave
disturbance of the public peace, or affect the international relations or the security
of society and the State. 7
2

Peru Legislative Decree Nº 46 (March, 1981)
Second Report on the Situation of Human Rights in Peru, Inter-Am. C.H.R. OEA/Ser.L/V/II/106, doc. 59 rev.
(2000) [hereinafter Peru Report 2000].
4
Const. Peru, art. 118(8) available at http://www.georgetown.edu/pdba/Constitutions/Peru/per93.htm] [hereinafter
Const. Peru].
5
Decree Law No. 25475, art. 12, May 5, 1992, available at
http://www.congreso.gob.pe/ntley/Imagenes/Leyes/25475.pdf. [hereinafter DL 25475].
6
Id.
7
http://www.cidh.org/countryrep/Peru2000en/chapter2a.htm, para. 79.
3

3

The legislation also provided that acts of terrorism would be punished with incarceration
for a period of not less than twenty years. 8
This legislative definition of terrorism has been harshly criticized as too “abstract and
vague.” It does not notify a person exactly what acts or omissions may trigger criminal liability. 9
Because the crime did not include an element of intent to commit terrorist acts, negligible
conduct such as petty theft could ultimately yield a conviction and sentence of 20 years to life in
prison. The International Commission of Jurists stated that conduct in violation of Article 2
“need not be associated at all with terrorism.”10 There is no distinction between the common
criminal and the work of a terrorist. “By not linking the proscribed conduct to the subjective
element of terrorist intent, this decree law can be interpreted to permit law enforcement officials
to regard almost any act of violence as a crime of terrorism.”11
The Inter-American Commission’s 2000 Report found that Article 2 violated Article 7(2)
of the American Convention in two ways: first, for failing to give a clear definition of terrorism
and second, for disproportional punishment. 12 Under the Convention, no person may be
deprived of his or her liberty without clear notice and a clear definition that his or her actions are
criminal. 13 Furthermore, Article 2 allowed the incarceration of one suspected of a terrorist act or
collaborating in terrorist acts for long periods of time, regardless of whether this person actually
committed the act. Article 2, the Commission concluded, “is a grave threat to the people’s
juridical security…a body of law contrary to universally accepted principles of legality, due

8

Peru Report, at ¶79.
Id. at ¶80.
10
International Commission of Jurists, Report on the Administration of Justice in Peru (published in Spanish by
Instituto de Defensa Legal, Lima, 1993, p. 45) (citing Decree Law No. 25475)
11
Id.
12
Peru Report, at ¶80.
13
Id. at ¶82.
9
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process, judicial guarantees.”14 The right to liberty set forth in Article 7(2) of the Convention
demands that no person may be subjected to arrest or imprisonment for an act that is
disproportionate to the crime charged or is unforeseeable. 15 Imprisonment for petty theft that
equates the act as a crime of terrorism is both disproportionate and unforeseeable.
b.

Decree Law 25475, Article 7 – Engaging in or Public Support of
Terrorism

Article 7 consisted of two parts. The first part of Article 7 stated that an individual who
is an accessory for the crime of terrorism or a leader of terrorism will receive 6-12 years in
prison upon conviction. 16 The second part of Article 7 stated that if the act was committed
outside of Peru by a Peruvian national, the individual would be stripped of his or her citizenship
and given a prison sentence of 6-12 years. 17
2.

Police Procedure
a.

Decree Law 25475, Article 12 – Pre-Trial Detention

Article 12 of DL 25475 established authority for police investigations into crimes of
terrorism. 18 This authority was vested in DINCOTE, a division of the National Police of Peru. It
decided whether there was sufficient evidence against an alleged terrorist to indict him or her. 19
According to the Commission this authority violated Article 8 of the Convention by denying the
accused due process of law. It allowed the DINCOTE to “impose incommunicado detention
unilaterally, without consulting with a judge.”20

14

Id. at ¶81.
Id. at ¶82.
16
DL 25475, at art. 7.
17
Id.
18
Id. at art.12.
19
Id. at ¶ 87. Peru Report, at ¶ 87.
20
Id.
15
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Article 12(d) of the 1992 law allowed the DINCOTE to detain an individual for 15 days
incommunicado. 21 During this period, under Article 12(c), DINCOTE’s only responsibility was
to notify a judge and the Public Ministry within 24 hours. 22 The Commission Report found that
these provisions violated Articles 7 and 8 of the Convention, which guarantee that a detainee
must be presented promptly before a judge and that he or she has a right to communicate freely
with counsel. 23 Under Article 8(2)(d) of the Convention, every detainee has the right to choose
counsel freely, regardless of whether counsel also represents other detainees. 24
Moreover, the Commission observed that the 15 day detention period is conducive to
torture and false confessions. This violates Article 5(2) of the Convention that prohibits torture
or cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment. Article 8(3) of the Convention prohibits the use of
statements obtained by torture as evidence at trial. 25
The International Commission of Jurists vividly described the environment of
incommunicado detention in its own report on Peru:
…the detainee is completely controlled by the police and is not subject to any
effective judicial supervision….the suspect when questioned normally is kept
bound and blindfolded and never sees his interrogators….generally there are eight
to ten police officers exerting tremendous pressures on the detainee….the suspect
is questioned....as a rule….at night. 26
3.

Right to Defense Counsel
a.

Decree Law 25475, Article 12(f) – Access to Defense Counsel

Under Article 12(f) of DL 25475, a suspect could have counsel of his or her choice. 27
However, no contact was allowed with counsel before the accused had given a statement in the
21

Id. at ¶ 88. DL 25475 at art.12.
Peru Report, at ¶ 1188.
23
Id. at ¶ 90.
24
Id.
25
Id. at ¶ 93 and 94.
26
International Commission of Jurists, Report on the Administration of Justice in Peru, (published in Spanish by
Instituto de Defensa Legal, Lima, 1993, p. 60).
22

6

presence of a representative from the Public Ministry. 28 Article 12 also limited each privately
retained defense attorney to only one client accused of terrorism. 29 Public defenders were not
given such a limitation. 30 However, only one year later, this limitation on private defense
attorneys was lifted when Article 18 was derogated by Article 4 of Decree-Law 26248
(hereinafter DL 26248), a law which modified several of the 1992 anti- terrorist decrees. 31
4.

Investigatory and Trial Phases
a.

Decree Law 25475, Article 13 – Investigatory and Trial Phases

Article 13 of DL 25475 established procedures for the trial of a person charged with
terrorism. 32 The judge, acting on a complaint issued by the prosecutor, should order the
initiation of the investigating phase within twenty- four hours of the suspect’s detention. 33 At this
point the judge issued an arrest warrant. The suspect remained in detention during the
investigation and trial. 34 The trial was limited to fifteen days of testimony and evidence after
which the verdict and sentence were announced by the judge. 35 The trial itself was not open to
the public. 36 Defense counsel was not allowed to seek substitution of judges. 37 Moreover,
Article 13(h) of the 1992 law prevented judges from recusing themselves. 38 Finally, the
anonymity of the judges allowed judges, who would otherwise disqualify themselves, to remain

27

Id. at art. 12(f). DL 25475, at art.12(f).
Id.
29
Id. at art. 18.
30
Id.
31
Decree Law No. 26248, art. 4, November 24, 1993, available at
http://www.congreso.gob.pe/ntley/Imagenes/Leyes/26248.pdf [hereinafter DL 26248].
32
DL 25475, at art. 13.
33
Id.
34
Id.
35
Id. at art. 13(f).
36
Id.
37
Id. at art. 13(h).
38
DL 25475, at art. 13(h).
28

7

on the bench. 39 These closed proceedings violated Article 8(5) of the Convention, which
recognizes a right to a public trial. 40
b.

Decree Law 25475, Article 13(c) – Witnesses

Article 13(c) of DL 25475 placed several restrictions on the use of witnesses at trial.
Under this article, police or military officers who participated in the writing of the official report
and preparing the file were prohibited from testifying as witnesses at the trial of the accused. 41
Furthermore, defense counsel was prohibited from interviewing these individuals prior to trial. 42
c.

Decree Law 25475, Article 15 – Faceless Judges

Article 15 of DL 25475 allowed for the use of faceless judges in terrorism trials.
It provided that the identity of the judges and members of the Public Ministry, and of the
justice auxiliaries who intervene in the trial of crimes of terrorism, shall be secret, to
which end measures will be adopted to guarantee that measure…the judicial rulings shall
not bear signatures or seals of the judges participating, nor of the justice auxiliaries…for
this purpose, codes and keys will be used, which shall also be kept secret. 43

Under this mandate, the identity of the judges, the members of the Public Ministry, as well as
that of the Justice Auxiliaries who participated in terroris m trials, were kept secret. To maintain
their identity secret, jud ges and Justice Auxiliaries were not required to sign or place their seals
on orders or judgments. The original purpose of this drastic law was to “protect judges,
prosecutors, and other officials involved in the judging of alleged members or collaborators of
dissident armed groups, in the face of possible reprisals.”
d.

44

Decree Law 25499 – Repentant Terrorist Law

39

Id.
American Convention on Human Rights, O.A.S. Treaty Series No. 36, 1144 U.N.T.S. 123 entered into force July
18, 1978, Article 8(5).
41
DL 25475, at art. 13(c).
42
Id.
43
Peru Report, at ¶ 102.
44
Id. at ¶ 105.
40
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DL 25499, also known as the Repentant Terrorist Law, was issued in May of 1992. 45
This law provided for the reduction, exemption or remission of a sentence for one accused or of
one already sentenced for terrorism if he or she provided “useful, truthful and detailed
information” about terrorist groups and if such information assisted the police in disrupting
further terrorist activity. 46 However, this provision was not made available to persons detained
or sentenced for their roles as leaders of terrorist cells or for acts of murder. 47 The law also
called for the Public Ministry to confirm the information provided by the repentant terrorist,
without independent verification. 48
5.

Sentencing

a.

Decree Law 25475, Article 3(a)(b)(c) – Penalty for Terrorism

Article 3(a) of DL 25475 imposed a life sentence for rebel leaders and persons directing
the commission of violent acts as prohibited by Article 2 of DL 25475. 49 Article 3(b) mandated
imprisonment of no less than 30 years to members of terrorist organizations who carried out
violent acts. 50 Article 3(c) imposed imprisonment of not less than 25 years for any member of a
terrorist organization who extorted, robbed, kidnapped, or took money, goods, or services from a
governmental unit or private individual by unlawful means. 51
b.

Decree Law 25475, Article 4 – Penalty for Collaborating with Terrorists

Article 4 of DL 25475 mandated imprisonment of not less than 20 years for a person who
voluntarily obtained, collected, or provided goods or methods of communication in collaboration

45

Decree Law No. 25499, May 12, 1992, available at http://www.congreso.gob.pe/ntley/Imagenes/Leyes/25499.pdf
[hereinafter DL 25499].
46
Id.
47
Id. at art. 1 (III).
48
Id. at art. 2.
49
DL 25475, at art. 3(a).
50
Id. at art. 3(b).
51
Id.
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with terrorists in violation of this Decree. 52 The article assigned the same imprisonment to those
who collaborated in any way in the carrying out of crimes declared illegal in this Decree, or
those who advanced the objectives of terrorist organizations. 53
c.

Decree Law 25475, Article 5 – Punishment for Membership in a Terrorist
Organization

Article 5 of DL 25475 called for the imprisonment of not less than 20 years for any
person who was a member of a terrorist organization. 54
III.
CONSTITUTIONAL COURT OF PERU AND THE 2003 AMENDMENTS
On January 3, 2003, the Constitutional Court of Peru issued a ruling in the case of
Marcelino Tineo Silva y más de 5,000 ciudadanos (hereinafter Tineo Silva).55 The Constitutional
Court recognized its jurisdiction over challenges to the constitutionality of Peruvian laws and
decrees. 56 In Tineo Silva, the Tribunal reviewed several provisions of the 1992 anti-terrorism
laws decreed by President Fujimori and the Peruvian Congress in light of the 1993 Constitution.
The Court upheld many provisions of the law but declared other sections of the laws
unconstitutional or in violation of the American Convention on Human Rights.
A.

DL 25475
1.

Definition of Terrorism

Article 2 of DL 25475 presented a major problem to the Constitutional Court. It noted
that Article 2 mirrored the provision of DL 25659 which defined the crime of treason. 57 DL
25659, creating the crime of treason, is duplicative of Article 2 of DL 25475 defining terrorism.
52

Id. at art. 4.
Id.
54
Id. at art. 5.
55
“Marcelino Tineo Silva y más de 5,000 ciudadanos”, TC [No. 8231] D.O. 236530 [hereinafter Tineo Silva].
56
Id. at 236532.
53
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This duplication and re-characterization of the same crime was found to have violated the
principle of legality in the Peruvian Constitution because it gave the Public Ministry and the
judiciary an unacceptable degree of discretion as to which crime fit a particular situation. 58 The
Constitutional Court cited the judgment of the International Court of Human Rights 59 in the
Petruzzi case, stating that the same definition for two separate crimes (terrorism and treason)
adversely affected the legal rights of the accused with respect to the applicable sanction, the
appropriate prosecuting authority, and the corresponding criminal process. 60
Next, the Constitutional Court analyzed the individual elements of DL 25475, 61 finding
that there were three elements that constitute terroris m under DL 25475. The first element of DL
25475 occurs when “[t]he party that provokes, creates or maintains a state of anxiety, alarm or
fear in the population or a part of the population”62 The Constitutional Court found that the
legislation opted for an objective standard as distinguished from a subjective standard of
responsibility found in prior anti-terrorist legislation in DL 46. 63 Specifically, the Constitutional
Court cited the Constitution of Peru, Article 2, Clause 24(d), which states that “no one will be
condemned for an act or omission that is not previously qualified in law, in an express and
unmistakable manner, as a punishable infraction.”64 The Constitutional Court also noted that
Article 2, Clause 24(d) of the Constitution of Peru reflects the principle found in Article 11 of the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, Article 9 of the American Convention on Human
Rights, and Article 25 of the International Covenant of Civil and Political Rights. 65 The

57

Id. at 236534.
Id. at 236535.
59
Id.
60
Id.
61
Tineo Silva, at 236536.
62
DL 25475, at art. 2.
63
Tineo Silva, at 236536.
64
Id. at 236535.
65
Id.
58

11

Constitutional Court ultimately held that the Constitution of Peru and Article 12 of the Penal
Code of 1991 require a subjective element of responsibility as a predicate for prosecution and
punishment. 66 The Constitutional Court hesitated to declare the wording of DL 25475
unconstitutional but instead mandated that the decree should be read to include a subjective
intent of the individual. It rejected an objective responsibility standard. 67
The second element in Article 2 of DL 25475 addresses acts directed against “the
property, the security of public buildings, thoroughfares or communication media or transport of
any type, energy or transmission towers, motor installations or any other goods or service.” 68
The open clauses “of any type” or “any other goods or service” were added to allow judges to
examine the charges in light of the purpose of the law. 69 With respect to the second element, the
Constitutional Court found that the prohibited conduct should be limited to goods or services that
are protected in Title XII of the Second Book of the Penal Code to reduce the margin of
application of DL 25475. 70 Specifically, the Constitutional Court took issue with two phrases in
the second element: “media or transportation of any type” and “any other good or service” and
limited the application to crimes against public security that affect the ways and means of
transportation or communication. 71 The Constitutional Court found that this violated Article
139(9) of the Constitution of Peru which delineates penal rights. 72
The third element in Article 2 of DL 25475 is the use of “arms, materials or explosive
devices or any other medium capable of causing damage or serious injury to the public peace or

66

Id. at 236537.
Id.
68
DL 25475, at art. 2.
69
Tineo Silva, at 236537.
70
Id.
71
Id.
72
Id.
67
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affecting international relations or the security of the society and the State.”73 The Court found
that within the third element, the use of “arms, materials, or explosive devices” must first be
connected to an act that causes a disruption to public peace. 74 Once the use of arms or
explosives is shown to have disrupted the public peace, a judge should then evaluate whether the
intent of the actor in using arms or explosives was to disrupt the public peace. 75
Ultimately, the Constitutional Court found that Article 2 of DL 25475 did not give
adequate notice to a person as to what acts are prohibited and what acts are permitted. 76 The
Constitutional Court found that Article 2 requires proof of three objective elements in addition to
the subjective intent of the actor. 77 Anything less would not be sufficient to constitute the crime
of terrorism. 78 There has been no further legislation to clear up the definition of current
terrorism. To date, the guidelines of the Constitutional Court is the most current definition of
“terrorism”.
2.

Engaging in the Support of Terrorism

The Constitutional Court declared both parts of Article 7 unconstitutional. 79 The
Constitutional Court found that the first part of the law failed to accurately describe what
“apologetic” acts violated its provisions. 80 This vagueness was deemed harmful to the
constitutional right of freedom of expression and dissemination of thought. 81 Therefore, the
Constitutional Court concluded that the legislature should narrow the law and to apply its
provisions only to the following situations: inciting a new act of terrorism, publicly prais ing an
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act of terroris m, or praising a convicted terrorist prisoner. 82 The Constitutional Court also stated
that such praise must reach a wide audience and offend the democratic rules of plurality,
tolerance, and consensus. 83 The Constitutional Court then directed that sentencing should follow
Section 316 of the Penal Code. 84
As to the second part, the Constitutional Court held that stripping a Peruvian of his or her
citizenship violates international treaties and Article 2, Clause 21 of the Peruvian Constitution. 85
Therefore, that part of the law was also unconstitutional. 86
In 2003, Congress passed Legislative Decree 924 in response to the Constitutional
Court’s ruling on Article 7. The legislative decree inserted a new paragraph in Penal Code 316,
stating that an “apologist” who incites the commission of an act of terrorism, apologizes for a
past terrorist crime, or praises a convicted terrorist will be sentenced to no t more than 12 and no t
less than 6 years. 87 The government can also impose fines as well as other restrictions, such as
barring the person from government employment and prohibiting the person from carrying
firearms. 88
3.

Police Procedure

The Constitutional Court examined the extent of governmental authority to hold suspects
incommunicado and ruled that such authority must be clearly delineated by law, and that such
authority cannot be absolute. 89 The plaintiffs in Tineo Silva argued that Article 12(d) of DL
25475 violated Article 24(g) of the 1993 Peruvian Constitution. 90 The Constitutional Court held
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that a suspect may be held incommunicado only if such detention would assist the police in
investigating terrorist acts, however such confinement must comply with time limits already
established by Peruvian law. 91 The Constitutional Court stated that holding a suspect
incommunicado for any other reason would violate the Peruvian Constitution as well as rulings
by the Inter-American Court of Human Rights. 92 Ultimately, the Constitutional Court declared
Article 12(d) of DL 25475 unconstitutional, as it did not clearly delineate the authority in
ordering incommunicado detention, although the Constitutional Court found that such authority
should normally lie with the investigatory judge. 93
Several changes were established in 2003 by DL 922 regarding the processing of
terrorism suspects. Article 12(2) of DL 922 now allows the prosecutor to request a judge to
order the incommunicado detention of a suspect. 94 This establishes authority in the investigative
judge and addresses the problem the Constitutional Court found in Article 12(d) of DL 25475.
4.

Right to Defense Counsel

The Constitutional Court refrained from making a final ruling on Article 12(f) of DL
25475, since this article was derogated by Article 2 of DL 26447, passed in 1994. However, the
Constitutional Court discussed the right to counsel as a fundamental right under Article 139(14)
of the 1993 Peruvian Constitution. 95 This right includes the right to freely choose an attorney
and to communicate with and be advised by an attorney. 96 DL 26477 derogated Article 12(f) and
now allows a suspect to designate a defense attorney and have his or her case evaluated by that
attorney starting at the time of arrest. 97
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5.

Investigatory and Trial Phases
a.

Detention

The plaintiffs in Tineo Silva argued that pre-trial detention as authorized in Article 13(a)
of DL 25475 violated the presumption of innocence guarantee found in the Peruvian
Constitution. 98 Article 2 of the 1993 Constitution declared that a person is innocent until he or
she has been found guilty of a crime. 99 The plaintiffs also argued that pretrial detention violated
Articles 7 and 8 of the American Convention on Human Rights. 100 The Constitutional Court
rejected the challenge, reasoning that the pretrial detention provision does not require the
investigating jud ge to declare innocence or guilt; detention is merely used as a preventive
measure which is permissible under Article 135 of the Criminal Procedure Code.101 The
Constitutional Court noted that the legislature had provided reasons for preventive detention,
such as deterring the accused from further criminal activity or preserving public order. The
Court concluded that the pre-trial detention law was not per se unconstitutional. 102 It cautioned,
however, that the application of this provision may violate the Constitution as well as Peru’s
obligations under international human rights treaties. 103
The secrecy of trials was authorized under Article 13(f) of DL 25475. 104 Currently,
Article 12(8) of DL 922 calls for public hearings except where national security, pub lic order,
morality or any other relevant reason is advanced. 105 A judge may on his or her own initiative,
or at the request of any party, restrict public hearings during the trial and order individuals who
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are not parties to a case to vacate the courtroom when certain evidence is presented. 106 Where
the judge orders a non-public, or a closed hearing, the accused enjoys the right to an automatic
appeal. 107
b.

Faceless Judges

The Court found that Article 15 had been repealed with the passage of DL 26671, which
declares that all judges who pass judgment on the crime of terrorism must be properly designated
and identified. 108
c.

Right to Defense Counsel

The Constitutional Court found that restrictions on access to counsel under the 1992 laws
had significantly interfered with the right of the accused to freely choose his or her attorney, a
right which is guaranteed under the Peruvian Constitution. 109 It recognized, however, that the
State may restrict a constitutional right when it seeks to protect other constitutional rights. 110
The Constitutional Court referred to the Petruzzi case decided by the Inter-American Court of
Human Rights (hereinafter IACHR), in which the IACHR found that although the restrictions to
counsel had limited the number of attorneys available, it was not a per se violation of the
American Convention on Human Rights. 111 Looking at the problem from the perspective of the
attorneys, the Constitutional Court found that while the Constitution provides that each person
may work freely, government limitations imposed on defense attorneys did not materially harm
this constitutional right. 112
d.

Witnesses
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The Constitutional Court acknowledged the right of the accused to present proof under
Article 139(3) of the 1993 Constitution. 113 This provision of the Constitution guarantees that the
accused cannot be deprived of the predetermined jurisdiction of his or her case, or have the case
heard in a forum not previously established by law. 114 The Constitutional Court also recognized
the right of the accused to call witnesses on his or her behalf and to question them as guaranteed
by Article 8(2)(f) of the American Convention on Human Rights. 115 However, the Constitutional
Court observed that these rights are subject to reasonable restrictions, if such restrictions advance
and protect other constitutional rights. 116 Since the restriction on the presentation of witnesses is
limited to members of the National Police of Peru, the Constitutional Court found that the
restriction was necessary to protect the lives of these police officers and their families, and was
therefore constitutional. 117 However, the Constitutional Court noted that a general prohibition on
the right of the accused to call police officers, who has detained him or her, as witnesses and to
confront them in open court is unconstitutional. 118
Next, the Constitutional Court discussed the Peruvian method of evaluating evidence in a
criminal trial. Since Peru does not employ a system of “fixed value” proof, 119 Article 238 of the
Criminal Procedure Code requires the judge to evaluate each piece of evidence by using
“equitable criteria.”120 Therefore, the Constitutional Court concluded that a trial judge should
normally require some corroborating evidence for a police report that weighs heavily in favor of
the judge’s verdict. 121 This also applies to official reports which had been compiled during the
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preliminary investigation. 122 However, Article 13 of DL 25475 placed strict limits on the
presentation of witnesses at trial. 123 Certain witnesses, including police officers and government
investigators, who were involved in the compilation of the official police report were excused
from testifying. 124 The Constitutional Court found this limitation to be constitutional as long as
it is used to protect the safety of police officers and their families. 125 The Constitutional Court
noted that the atmosphere of violence against police officers is a persuasive reason in declaring
the limitation constitutional. 126
The current law has not changed that practice. In fact, DL 922 exacerbates the
constitutional problem of confrontation because it allows the trial judge to remove the accused
from the courtroom if his or her presence would inhibit the nature of the witness’ testimony, 127
be it a police officer or a repentant terrorist who has evaded incarceration by naming the accused
as a terrorist.
The Constitutional Court acknowledged that the right of the accused to cross-examine
witnesses is protected in Article 8(2)(f) of the American Convention on Human Rights, 128 a
provision which was integrated into the 1993 Peruvian Constitution under the Constitution’s
“Fourth, Final and Transitory Disposition”, calling for the interpretation of the Peruvian
Constitution in accordance with Peru’s international law obligations. 129 Whatever justification
had been advanced in the past by the State to restrict the right of confrontation, changes in Peru
since the departure of Fujimori make the likelihood of terrorist retribution against police officers
or other witnesses substantially less likely to occur. The atmosphere of fear and danger that
122
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existed in 1992, when these restrictions were passed, does not exist to the same degree today. In
order to bring the retrials of terrorism suspects in line with Peruvian constitutional norms and
international standards of due process, the accused must be given the right to be present in the
courtroom throughout the trial and be allowed to confront and cross-examine all available
witnesses without regard to their status as police officers or repentant terrorists.
e.

Source of Evidence

The Constitutional Court did not require any changes to the Repentant Terrorist Law and
upheld the use of affidavits by repentant terrorists as part of the prosecutor’s evidence at trial. 130
The Constitutional Court concluded that eve n if the rules for the admissibility of evidence were
flawed in the initial trials, this did not necessarily mean that the source of such evidence was
unreliable for purposes of the retrials. 131
Currently, Article 8 of DL 922 establishes the standards of admissibility of evidence in
the retrials of those previously convicted of terrorism under the 1992 laws. 132 Permissible
evidence includes official police reports, affidavits of denunciations made by previous terrorism
suspects, technical and expert reports, as well as statements given to the police during an
investigation. 133 The new law calls for the trial judge to weigh each item of evidence by using
“equitable criteria” pursuant to the Peruvian Criminal Procedure Code, Article 283. 134 This
procedure does no t satisfy the guarantee of confrontation of witnesses under international law
standards for a fair trial.
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The use of ex parte statements made by repentant terrorists, who name the accused as a
terrorist, pursuant to the Repentant Terrorist Law of 1992, DL 25499, remains in effect. 135
Under the 1992 Repentant Terrorist Law, statements made by terrorist suspects could be used as
evidence to investigate, detain and convict others of terrorism, while granting procedural and
sentencing benefits to the repentant terrorist suspect.136 Although the 1992 law called for a
verification of these accusations, the authority of verification was given to the Public Ministry,
the very governmental entity that was responsible for prosecuting persons accused of
terrorism. 137 There was no requirement for an independent verification process by a neutral
entity. Although currently Article 8 of DL 922 calls for a judge to use “equitable criteria” in
evaluating the admissibility of such evidence, the judge is not required to order an independent
investigation into the truth of the statements made by the repentant terrorist. Article 8 of DL 922
states that the evaluation of the evidence should not harm the accused’s right to contradiction, 138
it does not, however, go far enough. It fails to allow the accused to independently challenge the
evidence itself. The history of using contaminated evidence, derived from terrorist suspects
during police interrogation, including the use of torture, requires that the courts in Peru today
deny the use of such evidence altogether. At a minimum, the law should allow the accused to
confront the affiant accusers at trial and to have an opportunity to effectively cross-examine them
in open court. The Peruvian Constitution also guarantees the accused the right to present a
legitimate defense. 139 By permitting the use of contaminated uncross-examined evidence, the
accused on retrial is stripped of that right as well.
f.

Sentencing
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The Constitutional Court declared Article 3(a), which had assigned a life term for a
violation of Article 2 by terrorist leaders, as unconstitutional on several grounds. 140 The
Constitutional Court, relying on the International Covenant of Civil and Political Rights,
acknowledged that the purpose of incarceration is to reform and socially retrain inmates for
reintegration into society. 141 The Constitutional Court also referred to Article 139, Clause 22 of
the Peruvian Constitution, which states that sentencing was to reflect, in part, the rehabilitation,
reeducation, and reincorporation of a prisoner into Peruvian society. 142 The Constitutional Court
concluded that a term of life imprisonment is “a beginning without an end”, denies the prisoner
the ability to be re- incorporated into Peruvian life, and frustrates the constitutional goal of
rehabilitation. 143
In addition, the Constitutional Court looked at life sentences in terms of the constitutional
principles of dignity and liberty. 144 The Constitutional Court declared that a life sentence results
in the annulment of the prisoner’s liberty, and thus the sentence should be temporary. 145 The
prisoner cannot be “rehabilitated,” “reformed,” “reincorporated into society,” and this violates
the right of “dignity of the person” provided in Article 1 of the Peruvian Constitution. 146 In
addition, a life sentence will not provide motivation for the State to rehabilitate the prisoner,
since he or she will never be ever released. 147

140

Tineo Silva, at 236547-8.
Id. at 236547.
142
Id.
143
Id.
144
Id. at 236547-48.
145
Id. at 236547.
146
Tineo Silva, at 236547.
147
Id.
141

22

Furthermore, the Constitutional Court stated that the length of a prison sentence should
be proportionate to the crime committed. 148 A life sentence is disproportionate to the crime of
terrorism. 149 Therefore, according to the Constitutional Court, Article 3(a) is unconstitutional,
and the legislature must write a law that allows parole for the prisoners. 150 Prisoners serving life
sentences should be offered parole after 30 years. 151 The Constitutional Court also declared all
sentences under Article 3(b) and (c), Article 4, and Article 5, which have a minimum sentence
but no maximum sentence, unconstitutional. 152 The Constitutional Court stated that according to
Article 200 of the Peruvian Constitution, punishment must satisfy the constitutional doctrine of
proportionality. 153 In determining sentences, the legislature must account for the seriousness of
the crime and the penalty it wishes to obtain. 154 While the Court must balance the rights of
Peruvian citizens against the rights of the convicted, the punishment cannot exceed the crime. 155
Since there are no upper limits to these sentences, the sentencing guidelines are not proportiona te
to the crimes committed and therefore unconstitutional. 156
The Constitutional Court referred to Articles 45, 46 and 29 of the Penal Code in relation
to Articles 3(b) and (c), 4 and 5 of DL 25475. 157 In Article 45 of the Penal Code, the judge
should consider the social and cultural background of the accused and the interests of the victim,
the victim’s family, and the interests of the persons who depend on the victim. 158 In Article 46
of the Penal Code, the judge should consider the following criteria in sentencing: the nature of
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the crime, the means employed, and the extent of the harm caused by the accused. 159 Finally, in
Article 29 of the Penal Code, the sentencing can be “temporary” or for life.160 If the sentencing
is temporary, then the minimum sentence is two days and the maximum is 35 years. 161 The
Court held that Articles 3(a), (b), (c), 4 and 5 are temporary sentences. 162 Therefore, the
legislature must impose a maximum sentence under these articles. 163
Congress passed Decree Law 921 in 2003 to amend the sentencing guidelines in Articles
3(a), (b) and (c), 4 and 5. 164 The first Article in Dl 921 allows a prisoner with a life sentence
under Article 2 in DL 25475 to be eligible for parole after 35 years. 165

The maximum sentences

for Articles 3(b), (c), 4, and 5 in DL 25475 are five years more than the minimum sentence. 166
Repeat offenders of DL 25475 will be sentenced to life in prison. 167
IV.
THE INTER-AMERICAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE
DECISIONS OF THE INTER-AMERICAN COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS AND
COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS: ADDRESSING PERU’S ANTI-TERRORISM RECORD.
The American Convention on Human Rights is a significant international treaty
established by the Organization of American States (OAS) to protect human rights. Member
States explicitly commit themselves to respect the rights and freedoms enumerated in the
Convention and to guarantee any person the free and full exercise of these rights without any
form of discrimination. The Convention recognizes that a member State may encounter an
internal conflict or acts of terrorism. Consequently, a member State may declare a state of
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emergency from time to time pursuant to its domestic laws to counter these problems. While the
Convention allows a State to impose reasonable limitations on certain rights, the Convention also
limits what rights cannot be suspended even under these circumstances. Article 27(1) of the
Convention provides:
In time of war, public danger, or other emergency that threatens
the independence or security of a State Party, it may take measures
derogating from its obligations under the present Convention to the
extent and for the period of time strictly required by the exigencies
of the situation, provided that such measures are not inconsistent
with its other obligations under international law and do not
involve discrimination on the ground of race, color, sex, language,
religion, or social origin. 168
Article 27(2) prohibits the suspension of the following articles: Article 3 (Right to
Juridical Personality); Article 4 (Right to Life); Article 5 (Right to Humane Treatment); Article 6
(Freedom from Slavery); Article 9 (Freedom from Ex Post Facto Laws); Article 12 (Freedom of
Conscience and Religion); Article 17 (Rights of the Family); Article 18 (Right to a Name);
Article 19 (Rights of the Child); Article 20 (Right to Nationality); and Article 23 (Right to
Participate in Government), “or of the judicial guarantees essential for the protection of such
rights.” 169
Peru has a long history of abuses. It has used its anti-terrorism laws to derogate nonderogable rights in contravention of the Convention. It had consistently rejected external
criticism of its laws and conduct.
The international community has recognized that Peru’s internal procedures were
woefully inadequate to redress human rights abuses. Claims of human rights were ignored
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altogether or minimized by parliamentary investigating commissions or by judicial decisions of
the military and civilian courts, which were tightly controlled by the government.
Peru has consistently argued that its anti- terrorism laws were essential to combat
subversive and terrorist activities which could not be addressed effectively in a judicial
framework that is concerned more with human rights than the security of the State.
A.

Decisions of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights
Ever since Peru ratified the Inter-American Convention on Human Rights, the

Commission has received numerous petitions from individuals and groups alleging a variety of
human rights violations, especially after the enactment of the 1992 Peruvian anti-terrorism
legislation. Uniformly, the Commission has ruled that Peru’s anti- terrorism laws and practices
violated core human rights which are protected under the American Convention on Human
Rights (hereinafter “Convention”). In the following four cases, which we highlight, the
Commission addressed allegations of serious misconduct by Peru in the arrest, detention and
prosecution of individuals accused of terrorism. Finding serious violations under the
Convention, the Commission granted remedies that would compensate the victims; it also
suggested amendments to the Peruvian law to bring it into conformity with the Convention.
1.

Case 11.084, IACHR (Peru, November 30, 1994)

The petitioner's husband, Major General (retd.) Jaime Salinas Sedo, and their son, Jaime
Salinas Lopez Torres, met with several Peruvian army officers on November 12, 1992. 170 The
purpose of this “coordination meeting” was to examine the possibility of “bringing down the de
facto regime” of Alberto Fujimori. 171 The individuals involved believed it was their
constitutional duty to “restor[e] the democratic system”, and that this belief was supported by
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Articles 74, 82 and 307 of the Constitution of 1979. 172 The meeting lasted past midnight, but
discussion did not progress beyond a “preparatory stage.”173 Any plans to move beyond this
stage were cancelled prior to the end of the meeting at approximately 1 a.m. 174
Sedo and Torres remained at the location past the meeting's end with a number of
officers. 175 At approximately 3:15 a.m., special army officers surrounded the location and
opened fire on the unsuspecting individuals inside. 176 The special army officers shot at Sedo as
he attempted to evacuate the building and reach his armored vehicle. 177 Sedo was unarmed and
wearing civilian clothing. 178 He was wounded from the gunfire but managed to operate his car in
order to drive to Army Headquarters. 179 His intentions were to surrender at once so that his life
and the lives of the others still in the building might be spared. 180 Sedo and Torres, as well as the
other people who attended the meeting, were subsequently arrested, without any warrant, by the
army. 181
All the individuals who had been arrested, the petitioners in the Commission case,
asserted that their arrest and treatment during detention violated rights guaranteed by the
Peruvian Constitution (Article 2, subparagraph 20(f) and Article 233, paragraphs 3 and 9) and
the American Convention (Article 8, subparagraphs 2(b), (c), (f), (h) and Article 5). 182 Before
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having an opportunity to consult with counsel, the army began to interrogate them. 183 During
these initial interrogations, the petitioners alleged that they were psychologically coerced into
signing statements without the benefit of first reading them to vouch for their accuracy. 184 The
government did not acknowledge their right to a fair trial pursuant to usual procedures, but
instead conducted secret proceedings in military court. 185 The final judgment in the Supreme
Court of Military Justice relied completely on various reports which were developed during the
police investigation. 186 The petitioners also contested the jurisdiction of the military court, since
several individuals, including the petitioner's husband, had already retired from the army. 187
They argued that civil courts were the proper venue according to Article 2, subparagraph 20 of
the Peruvian Constitution and Article 8, subparagraph 1 of the American Convention. 188
Sedo, Torres and the others, who later brought suit before the Commission, were found
guilty by the Peruvian military court and were initially sent to the Miguel Castro prison, which
normally housed only “extremely dangerous criminals.”189 They were later moved to the
Castillo Real Felipe. 190 Castillo Real Felipe had insufficient supply of water, no windows,
offered no access to medical care and contained “unserviceable hygiene facilities.”191 In addition
to these claims, the y alleged that the Intelligence Service had monitored their conversations. 192
The Commission found that Special Forces held the detainees without access to an
attorney for more than fifteen days in violation of Article 8 of the Convention, Article 2 of the
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1970 Constitution, and Article 526 of the Code of Military Justice. The Commission also found
that the detainees were interrogated at abnormal times, usually at night or very early in the
morning hours, and for over twelve hours at a time, all in clear violation of the right to personal
liberty guaranteed in Article 8 of the Convention. They were physically and psychologically
tortured into confessing. The Commission also determined that they were denied a fair trial and
the right to adequately defend against the charges. Their attorneys’ requests to inspect the files
and the evidence and for oral testimony were denied as “unnecessary”. The Commission held
that the trial proceedings had violated Article 8(2) of the Convention, in that the military tribunal
refused to accept defense witnesses; their lawyers’ objections were systematically refused on
grounds that they were unsustainable; and the sentences were disproportionate to the severity of
the crime. Consequently, the Commission ordered Peru to conduct a serious, impartial, and
effective investigation into the claim of torture, punish the offenders, and take steps to put an end
to this practice. It also ordered Peru to compensate them monetarily for damages arising from
these violations. Peru was ordered to review their convictions by an independent and impartial
forum and to amend Decree Law 25475 so as to bring it into compliance with the Convention. 193
2.

Case 10.970, IACHR (Peru March 1, 1999)

On October 17, 1991, Fernando Mejia Egocheaga and his wife Raquel Martin de Mejia
petitioned the Commission alleging violations of Article 7 (right to personal liberty), Article 5
(right to humane treatment), Article 4 (right to life), and Article 25 (the right to an effective
domestic remedy to protect against acts that violate fundamental rights) of the Convention. 194
In June 1989, several soldiers were killed by members of Sendero Luminoso (“Shining
Path”) in Posuzo. On June 15, 1989, a group of military personnel whose faces were covered
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with ski masks and carrying machine guns violently entered the home of the Secretary General
of the Peruvian Education Workers’ Union. The soldiers made the union leader leave his home,
beat him in front of his wife, and then ordered him to drive to Mejia’s home. The ski masked
personnel entered Mejia’s home, struck him with a weapon and ordered him to leave the home
with the group. Fifteen minutes later, the group returned to the Mejia home and one of the men
raped Mrs. Mejia. Twenty minutes later, the same person returned and raped her again. The
next day, she went to the police station in Oxapampa and reported the disappearance of her
husband. She requested the assistance of the Mayor of Oxapampa but to no avail. On June 18,
Mr. Mejia’s dead body was found with clear signs of torture, cuts in the legs and arms and an
open wound in the head, apparently caused by a bullet. On three occasions, between June 28 and
30 1989, Mrs. Mejia received anonymous telephone calls threatening her with death if she
persisted with the investigation of the murder of her husband. Mrs. Mejia fled Peru in fear of her
safety. 195
The Peruvian government published a list of accused subversives, including Mrs. Mejia’s
name, in which it alleged that she supported the Shining Path. The government demanded the
extradition of the people on the list; if the named person did not return to Peru, the Peruvian
government threatened to revoke his or her citizenship. In addition to the extradition list, the
Peruvian government filed criminal charges against Mrs. Mejia under the anti-terrorism laws,
accusing her of supporting the Shining Path.
Mejia maintained her innocence, sought redress from the Commission and attached
copies of the opinions of the Lima Provincial Prosecutor and of the Senior Prosecutor for
Terrorism to her Commission petition, showing that there was no evidence to substantiate the
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charges against her. Because the government failed to refute any of her allegations, the
Commission accepted her factual claims as true. 196
a.

Articles 5 and 11 of the Convention

The Commission determined that the repeated rape of Mrs. Mejia constituted a violation
of Articles 5 and 11 of the Convention, which guarantee every person the right to have his or her
physical, mental and moral integrity respected, and that no one should be subjected to torture or
to cruel, inhumane or degrading punishment or treatment. Although the Convention does not
precisely define “torture”, the Commission declared that it includes “any act performed
intentionally by which physical and mental pain or suffering is inflicted on a person for purposes
of criminal investigation, as a means of intimidation, as a personal punishment, as a preventive
measure, as a penalty or for any other purpose”. 197 In order to find torture, three elements must
be present: (1) an act through which physical or mental pain and suffering is inflicted on a
person; (2) the act is committed with intent; and (3) the act is committed by either a public
official or by a private person acting at the instigation or direction of a public official. In
applying this standard, the Commission found that the rape of Mrs. Mejia satisfied the first prong
because rape is a violent act causing physical and mental pain.
The Special Rapporteur on Torture has noted that particularly in Peru, rape is used as a
weapon to punish, intimidate or humiliate. 198 In applying the second prong, the Commission
found that the rape here was intentionally done to produce a certain result, namely to scare and
intimidate her so that she would not pursue an investigation of the murder of her husband. The
third prong was also satisfied because the rapist was a member of the security forces. Having
196
197

Id.
Inter-American Convention to Prevent and Punish Torture, OEA/Ser.L.V./II.82 doc.6 rev. 1 at 83 (1992).

31

satisfied all the requirements of torture, the Commission found that Peru violated Article 5 of the
Convention. 199
The Commission also found that Peru had violated Article 11 of the Convention, which
requires a State to guarantee every person his or her dignity. The Special Rapporteur on Torture
has stated that rape is an attack against human dignity. 200 Further, the European Court of Human
Rights has acknowledged that the concept of dignity extends to a person’s physical and moral
integrity. 201 Rape denied her dignity. Therefore, the rape of Mrs. Mejia also violated Article 11
of the Convention. 202
b.

Articles 25 and 8 of the Convention

The Court next analyzed Mrs. Mejia’s claims that the denial of domestic remedies
violated Articles 25 and 8(1) of the Convention. Article 25 provides that:
1.
Everyone has the right to simple and prompt recourse, or
any other effective recourse, to a competent court or tribunal for
protection against acts that violate his [or her] fundamental rights
recognized by the constitution or laws of the state concerned or by
this Convention even though such violation may have been
committed by persons acting in the course of their official duties.
2.
The States Parties undertake: (a) to ensure that any person
claiming such remedy shall have his [or her] rights determined by
the competent authority provided for by the legal system of the
State; (b) to develop the possibilities of judicial remedy; and (c) to
ensure that the competent authorities shall enforce such remedies
when granted. 203
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Article 8 provides that every person has the right to a hearing, with due guarantees and
within a reasonable time, by a competent, independent, and impartial tribunal. 204 The
Commission pointed to the Inter-American Court of Human Rights decision in the Velasquez
Rodriguez case to bring this Article to life. 205 In that case, the Court had stated that “The State
has the judicial duty to prevent…human rights violations, to purposefully investigate such
violations and apply to those responsible the appropriate penalties and ensure adequate
compensation to the victims.”206
A purposeful investigation implies that an appropriate State authority will undertake an
investigation as a legal duty and “not as a simple matter of management of private interests that
depends on the initiative of the victim or of his family in bringing suit.”207 In applying these
principles, the Commission found that Mrs. Mejia did not have access to an effective domestic
remedy to vindicate her claims of human rights violations. Therefore, Peru violated Articles 25
and 8 of the Convention. 208
c.

Article 13 of Decree Law No. 25.475 (The Anti-Terrorism Legislation)

The Commission next considered whether the Peruvian procedures in trying Mrs. Mejia
for the crime of terrorism under Law No. 25.475 had violated her human rights under the
Convention. Article 13 of this Decree-Law outlines the procedures for a preliminary
investigation and subsequent proceedings against individuals suspected of terrorism. 209
Article 8 of the Convention provides the accused the right to a fair trial by a competent,
independent, and impartial tribunal and the presumption of innocence. The Commission
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concluded that Article 13 of the Decree- Law did not satisfy guarantees of Article 8. Contrary,
Article 13 of the Decree-Law created judicial partiality and a presumption of guilt. In
accordance with its decision, the Commission recommended that Peru conduct a thorough, rapid
and impartial investigation into the rape, pay her fair compensation for her suffering, and to
inform the Commission within sixty days of the decision what steps it took to give effect to the
Commission’s recommendations. 210
3.

Cases 10.941, 10.942, 10.944, 10.945 IACHR (Peru February 19, 1998)

The Commission received petitions on behalf of Camilo Alarcon Espinoza and Sara Luz
Mozombite (10.941), Jeronimo Villar Salome (10.942), Alvaro Hachiguy Izquierdo (10.944),
and Daniel Huaman Amacifuen (10.945). 211 The Commission combined the complaints because
of their similarities in complaining about the disappearances of Luz Mozombite Quinonez,
Camilo Alarcon Espinoza, Jeronimo Villar Salome, Alvaro Hachiguy Izquierdo and Daniel
Huanman Amacifuen. 212 The petitions claimed that members of the Peruvian Army stationed in
the military base in Aucuyacu were responsible for the forced disappearances of these
individuals in violation of Articles 4, 5, 7, 8 and 25 of the American Convention. 213 Since their
disappearances, none of their families or fr iends had seen or heard from them. 214 Prior to filing
these petitions, the claimants sought investigations of the disappearances from the government,
however no investigations were initiated by Peru. 215
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The Commission observed that the practice of forced disappearance violates fundamental
human rights, including personal liberty and the right to due process. 216
a.

Article 3 of the Convention: Right to Juridical Personality

Article 3 of the Convention establishes the right to recognition as a person before the
law. 217 The Commission found that a forced disappearance effectively removes a person from
any normal legal order of the State, thus violating Article 3 of the Convention. 218
b.

Article 4 of the Convention: Right to Life

Article 4(1) of the Convention recognizes that all individuals have the right to life. 219
The Commission reiterated the position of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights, found in
the Velasquez Rodriguez case, that a forced disappearance usually implicates an extra-judicial
execution and the concealment of the body and of material evidence. 220 This practice is a
flagrant violation of the right to life provided in Article 4 of the Convention. 221
c.

Article 5 of the Convention: Right to Humane Treatment

The Commission also followed another Velasquez finding that prolonged isolation and
the denial of communication with the outside world constitute cruel and inhumane treatment,
because these practices are harmful to the psychological and moral integrity of the person. 222
Therefore, Peru violated Article 5 of the Convention in this respect. 223
d.

Article 7 of the Convention: Right to Personal Liberty
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Article 7 of the Convention guarantees each person the right to personal liberty. 224 The
Commission expounded on when a detention violates this provision. 225 A detention is arbitrary
and illegal when it is instituted for illegal purposes, carried out without observing appropriate
legal standards, or used as punishment in derogation of the right to a fair trial. 226 In applying
these principles to the case, the Commission found that the Peruvian Army violated Article 7. 227
The Commission noted that the government, in response to the petitions, claimed that the
region was under a state of emergency and that it acted to combat terrorism. 228 Consequently,
the government suspended some constitutional guarantees to allow the military to detain
individuals without court orders from a competent judge and without a showing that a serious
crime had been committed. 229 The Commission rejected the government’s claim, stating that
under the Convention, the right to personal liberty can never be derogated. 230 Democratic
principles demand observance of this right even under a state of emergency. 231 Therefore, the
Commission concluded that Peru was responsible for violating the right to personal liberty and
security as established in Article 7 of the Convention. 232
e.

Article 25 of the Convention: Right to Judicial Protection

Article 25 of the Convention provides that every person has the right to judicial
protection. 233 The Commission concluded that Peru failed to adequately investigate the
disappearances. 234 It recommended that Peru reactivate an investigation into the disappearances
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to establish the whereabouts of the individuals who had disappeared, identify those responsible
and punish them accordingly. 235 Further, the Commission recommended that Peru compensate
the relatives. 236 More importantly, the Commission recommended that Peru revise its domestic
laws so as to provide meaningful investigations for similar claims of disappearance. 237
4.

Case 11.182, IACHR (Peru April 13, 2000)

On June 23, 1993, the nongovernmental organization APRODEH filed a petition against
Peru claiming that Peru had violated the rights of Rodolfo Gerbert Asencios Lindo, Rodolfo
Dynnik Asencios Lindo, Marco Antonio Ambrosio Concha, and Carlos Florentino Molero Coca
(hereinafter “the victims”). The undisputed facts of this case show that the victims were detained
by DINCOTE on suspicion of terrorism, tortured, convicted and sentenced to 10-12 by faceless
judges. For example, Rodolfo Gerbert Asencios Lindo testified before the 45th Criminal Judge
of Lima that he was punched in the stomach, kidneys and head; kicked in the shin; placed against
an inclined desk while his arms were twisted; threatened with rape; and kept blindfolded in a
dark room the entire time. Further, the main case file was sent to the Special Chamber of the
Superior Court, composed of “faceless” judges, which in turn sent it to the faceless superior
prosecutor. The trial was held before faceless judges. The petitioner claimed that these actions
had violated the victims’ right to personal freedom, humane treatment, and a fair trial in violation
of Articles 7, 5, and 8 of the Convention. Peru did not dispute the facts and denied that its
actions violated the Convention. 238
The Commission acknowledged that the 1992 anti- terrorism legislation was enacted after
Lima had suffered its most violent wave of terrorist attacks. Decree-Laws No. 25475 and 25659

235

Id.
Id.
237
Id.
238
Case 11.182, Inter-Am. C.H.R., OEA/Ser.L/V/II.106, doc. 6 rev. (1999) [hereinafter case 11.182].
236

37

governed the prosecution, trial, and sentencing of persons found guilty of the crimes of terrorism
and treason. It was under this legislation that the victims here were accused, tried and convicted
of the crime of terrorism. Therefore, the Commission addressed the question whether in
following this Decree-Law, Peru had violated the Convention. The Commission clarified Article
27 of the Convention, which provides guidelines and procedures to be used in times of war,
public danger, or other emergencies that threaten the security of the party State. The
Commission’s clarification of Article 27 of the Convention was well overdue because State
parties, such as Peru, had often taken refuge in the fact that their anti-terrorism laws allowed
them to relax or disregard legal formalities during a state of emergency.
The Commission stated that while Article 27 of the Convention allows State parties to
suspend some of their international obligations, it clearly prohibits the suspension of Article 3
(Right to Jur idical Personality); Article 4 (Right to Life); Article 5 (Right to Humane Treatment);
Article 6 (Freedom from Slavery); Article 9 (Freedom from Ex Post Facto Laws); Article 12
(Freedom of Conscience and Religion); Article 17 (Rights of the Family); Article 18 (Right to a
Name); Article 19 (Rights of the Child); Article 20 (Right to Nationality); and Article 23 (Right
to Participate in Government). Additionally, Article 27 provides that any suspension of rights
cannot permit discrimination of any kind against any person or group. 239
The Commission concluded that Article 2 of the relevant legislation, which defined
terrorism “as an act aimed at provoking, creating, or maintaining anxiety, alarm, and fear” and
attempts to do the same, did not provide an adequate definition of what act constitutes a crime;
equally, what was prohibited by the law was not foreseeable. 240
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The Commission also reviewed Article 12 of the legislation, which authorized the
National Police to investigate terrorist crimes through DINCOTE. DINCOTE alone has the
authority to decide whether the evidence is sufficient to charge, what charges to pursue, and
whether the accused would appear before a civilian or a military court. Further, Article 12 also
allowed the police to detain suspects for fifteen days incommunicado. Defense attorneys were
prohibited from representing more than one person. The Commission concluded that Peru’s
legislation gave excessive powers to its police force in violation of Article 8, which guarantees
the right to due process. 241
Before even ruling on whether Peru’s actions had violated the rights of the victims here,
the Commission ruled that Peru’s anti-terrorism legislation, Decree Law 25475, violated Articles
7 and 8 of the Convention per se. 242 Accordingly, the Commission ruled that Peru’s actions in
apprehending, detaining and bringing charges against the accused had violated their rights
enshrined in Articles 7 and 8 of the Convention.
B.

Decisions of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights
The Inter-American Court of Human Rights (IACHR) is "an autonomous judicial

institution whose purpose is the application and interpretation of the American Convention on
Human Rights."243 The IACHR was established to enforce and interpret the provisions of the
American Convention. 244 While it does serve an advisory role, providing member States with its
advice regarding legislation and procedures, the IACHR also serves an adjudicative purpose. 245
When a case is brought before the Court, either through a State party or through the Inter-
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American Commission on Human Rights, the adjudicatory function of IACHR requires it to rule
for or against the member State that is accused of violating human rights under the American
Convention. Member States must submit to the jurisdiction of the IACHR as a condition of
membership. 246
The cases discussed in this section demonstrate that the IACHR has consistently found
Peru's former anti-terrorism legislation to be in violation of the American Convention. The
following four cases, Petruzzi, Tamayo, Altos and Durand and Ugarte, illustrate recent decisions
by the IACHR regarding Peru's 1992 legislation. Each ruling details the specific aspects of the
1992 legislation that the IACHR found to be in violation of the American Convention. In each
of these cases, the IACHR had ordered Peru to make appropriate changes to its law in
compliance with its decisions. However, as will be discussed at the conclusion of this section,
Peru's current legislation fails to bring Peru into complete compliance with the Court’s decisions,
and thus Peru remains in violation of human rights under the American Convention.
The first two cases, Petruzzi and Tamayo, are the two most significant cases decided by
the IACHR. While these two cases examined Peruvian 1992 laws and procedures, they remain
extremely relevant in analyzing the legality of the 2003 amendments to the anti-terrorism laws.
It is clear that these amendments fail in several respects to comply with the orders of the IACHR
found in these cases.
1.

The Petruzzi Case

Castillo Petruzzi was prosecuted before the Military Court of the Peruvian Air Force
(FAP) on the charge of treason. 247 Petruzzi and two other defendants were all found guilty in
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“hooded trials” and sentenced to life imprisonment. 248 Peru claimed that from 1980 to 1994, the
State had experienced such “terrible social upheaval[,] caused by terrorist violence,” that it had
to resort to military trials to sort out all the instances of terrorism. 249
Petruzzi and his co-defendants, were tried in the military courts during a declared state of
emergency. 250 Peru claimed that a state of emergency allowed her to suspend certain provisions
of its Constitution, 251 including Section 20 pertaining to arrest procedures and appearances
before a judge. 252 The state of emergency, according to Peru, allowed it to establish a Military
Political Commander who oversaw the judicial system during the declared state of emergency. 253
In reference to this particular case, the state of emergency was in effect for the duration of the
entire period in which the three individuals were on trial. 254 The state of emergency allowed for
a police investigation and the interrogation of a prisoner without the benefit of legal counsel. 255
Suspects did not have normal procedural rights usually associated with a civilian criminal trial.256
Here, “faceless judges” were permitted to conduct the hearings as they saw fit, free of any
restraints. For example, when Petruzzi’s attorney filed two petitions for a writ of habeas corpus,
seeking permission to contact his client while in prison and to allow his family to visit him, 257
both petitions were denied. 258
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Mr. Petruzzi was provided defense counsel on November 25, 1993 in a hearing at the Las
Palmas Military Base for depositions in the fact- finding phase of the trial. 259 Defense counsel
requested that he be allowed access to the case file, invoking the right of defense. 260 On
November 29, counsel was advised that he would be allowed access to the case file for thirty
minutes on December 2, an “abbreviated time period that the law allows for cases of this kind,”
meaning cases held in the military court system. 261 Although defense counsel repeatedly
requested that he be allowed to access the file for a reasonable period of time, the judge of the
special military court allowed Petruzzi’s counsel access to the case file for approximately thirty
minutes. 262
The Inter-American Court made the following factual findings. First, Petruzzi’s defense
counsel was not permitted to privately confer with his client before the preliminary hearing or
even before the finding of first instance. 263 Instead, defense counsel was only permitted to meet
privately with his client for fifteen minutes after the court had already reached a decision in the
first instance. 264 Secondly, after Petruzzi was taken into custody, he was blindfolded and
handcuffed for the duration of the preliminary hearing. 265 Third, during the hearing neither the
accused nor his attorney was given any access to the prosecutor’s evidence against him. 266
Similarly, the defense attorney was not permitted to cross-examine the witnesses who had
provided testimony in the police investigative report. Additionally, Petruzzi’s preliminary
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hearing was not signed by the officers of the court who presided at the hearing. 267 Finally,
defense counsel was intimidated when representing his client. 268
On January 7, 1994, one day after defense counsel was given forty minutes to review the
case file, the judge rejected his motion to dismiss the charge over a claim that the court lacked
jurisdiction and convicted him of the crime of treason. 269 The court sentenced Petruzzi to life
imprisonment with continuous confinement to his cell during the first year of incarceration and
followed by forced labor for the remainder of his term. 270 Petruzzi’s defense attorney sought to
appeal the judgment, and the case was then referred to the special tribunal of the Supreme Court
of Military Justice. 271 On May 3, 1994, the special tribunal of the Supreme Court of Military
Justice dismissed the appeal. 272
The IACHR first determined that it did not have jurisdiction to evaluate the nature or
gravity of the crimes charged here, as each member State has the right and duty to determine its
own security needs. 273 However, the prosecution and sentencing procedures, which a member
State deems necessary to preserve public safety or national security, are subject to scrutiny by the
Court for human rights violations. 274 When there are allegations that a member State has
violated human rights provisions, the IACHR can adjudicate the claims against the member
State. First, the IACHR has the authority to rule that a member State’s actions, whether they are
court procedures or prison conditions, violate human rights thereby subjecting the member State
to its international responsibility. 275 However, the question whether Petruzzi and his co-
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defendants were guilty of treason is beyond the competence of the Court. Second, while the
Court has the authority to review claims of human rights violations, the claimant must first seek
and exhaust the member State’s domestic remedies before the IACHR can make a determination
against the member State. 276
a.

Violation of Article 7 (5): Right to Personal Liberty

In this proceeding, the IACHR, by a vote of seven to one, found that Peru had violated
Article 7(5). 277 The IACHR determined that Peru had violated Article 7 of the Convention by
not bringing the arrestees before a judge within a reasonable time. 278 In the Petruzzi case, “the
military judge was not notified of the arrests, searches and expert reports and opinions until 30
days after the fact.”279 According to the Court, the Convention, as stated in Article 7, requires
that “any person detained is to be brought before a judge either immediately or after an
acceptable delay.”280 According to the standards set forth by the Inter-American Commission,
an acceptable delay would be limited to only “the amount of time needed to prepare the transfer”
of a detainee. 281
The Court recognized the fact that a member State has the right and duty to protect itself
from terrorist attacks, however, the steps that a State takes to protect itself must still ensure due
process rights for those who are detained and charged. 282 While Article 27 of the Convention
allows for more relaxed human rights standards during a state of emergency, even then, “only
certain rights are derogable.”283 The Court concluded that Peru failed to prove the existence of a
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serious state of emergency to warrant these violations, finding that the rights that were denied
here were too harsh in light of international standards. 284
b.

Violation of Article 8(1): Right to a Fair Trial

The Court found, in a unanimous decision, that Peru had violated Article 8. 285 Under
Article 8(1) of the Convention, “[e]very person has the right to a hearing, with due process
guarantees and within a reasonable time, by a competent, independent and impartial tribunal,
previously established by law…”286 The military tribunal here did not satisfy this guarantee.
Although the use of a military tribunal may not per se violate due process or fair trial rights, in
recent times “an international consensus has developed in favor of the need to restrict it
whenever possible, and to protect exercise of military jurisdiction vis-à-vis civilians, especially
in emergency situations.”287 The Court concluded that Peru’s military court’s jurisdiction is
limited and is designed to maintain discipline in the military and the police force. 288 Therefore,
the IACHR disagreed with Peru which had claimed that it should be allowed to use its military
court system to prosecute persons charged as terrorists in order to protect the judges by keeping
their identity secret. Military tribunals by hooded or faceless judges violate the accused’s right
to due process of law and the right to be judged by an independent and impartial judge. 289 The
Court therefore concluded that the military court here had acted contrary to international human
rights standards and in violation of the Convention. 290
c.

Violation of Article 8(2)(b) and 8(2)(c): Adequate Time and Means
for the Preparation of the Defense
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The IACHR determined six votes to one that Peru violated Article 8(2)(b) and (2)(c). 291
Under these articles, “any person accused of a criminal offense has the right to know the charges
against him [or her] and to have adequate time and means to prepare his [or her] defense.”292
The manner in which Peru treated its detainees through the use of military tribunals and hooded
judges substantially affected the presumption of innocence and fundamental due process
rights. 293 Additionally, the IACHR found that the military courts in Peru had failed to provide
defense attorneys adequate time with which to prepare a defense, giving the m one day at most.
Finally, Peru’s method of prosecuting suspected terrorists and gathering evidence makes justice
meaningless, since the outcomes of the hooded trials were almost predetermined, noting that
evidence that was used to convict persons of terrorism did not come from “evidence taken at
trial, but rather [from] expanded police investigation reports that the accused had not seen.”294
The Court reasoned that according to international standards, including standards of the
Convention, it is a fundamental principle of procedural law that the evidence which is used to
establish the guilt of the accused must be produced in court and offered in such a way so as to
allow the defense an adequate opportunity to contest it. 295 The IACHR ruled that the
investigation in the preliminary stage should be separate and distinct from the evidence gathering
and fact finding phase of the trial. 296 Here, defense counsel were unable to confer with their
clients until after the y made preliminary statements, and even then military personnel were
present the entire time. 297 The Court concluded that the verdict here was based exclusively on
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evidence that the defense was not permitted to view or challenge in violation of Article 8 (2) (B)
and (2) (C). 298
d.

Violation of Article 8(2)(d): Right to Legal Counsel of One’s
Choosing

By a vote of six to one, the Court found that Peru violated Article 8(2)(d). 299 Every
accused person has the right to defend himself or herself personally and to be represented by
counsel of one’s choosing. This right allows free and private consultation without
interruption. 300 Here, Petruzzi was denied the right to choose his own defense attorney and was
not given the right to discuss his case privately with his attorney in violation of Article 8
(2)(D). 301
e.

Violation of Article 8(2)(f): Right to Examine Witnesses

By a six to one vote, the IACHR determined that Peru also denied Petruzzi his right
under Article 8 (2)(f). 302 The Court recognized that it is “very difficult to get the police or army
agents who took part in the investigation to appear in court,” since they have an interest in
convicting the accused and are not impartial. Under such circumstances, the accused is denied
an opportunity to cross-examine the witnesses against him or her. 303 Since neither Petruzzi nor
his defense counsel was present when the agents’ statements were taken, he and his codefendants were denied their right of cross-examination. 304
f.

Violation of Article 8(2)(h): Right to Appeal the Judgment to a
Higher Court
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Unanimously, the IACHR determined that Peru violated Article 8(2)(h) in its handling of
the Petruzzi case. 305 The IACHR considers the right to appeal a conviction to a higher court as
“an essential part of due process and is non-derogable,” under any circumstances. 306 Here, the
IACHR concluded that there was no option for Petruzzi to appeal to a higher court because the
prosecution was conducted in the military court system. 307
g.

Violation of Articles 25 and 7(6): Judicial Protection

By a six to one vote, the IACHR also found that Peru had violated Articles 25 and
7(6). 308 According to the IACHR, any person who is deprived of his or her liberty is entitled to
recourse to a competent court which must decide without delay on the lawfulness of the arrest or
detention. 309 The Court concluded that Petruzzi and his co-defendants were not tried by a
competent court and that they were denied judicial review of any kind to determine the
lawfulness of their arrests. 310
h.

Remedies

The Court unanimously ordered Peru to make the following remedial actions. First, Peru
was ordered to adopt appropriate measures to amend those provisions of the law that were found
to be in violation of the American Convention on Human Rights, without exception. 311 Second,
IACHR ordered Peru pay a sum totaling US $10,000.00, or the equivalent in Peruvian currency,
to the next of kin of Petruzzi and Francisco, the second remaining accused. 312 Finally, the
IACHR agreed to oversee that Peru complies with these orders. 313
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As the most significant Inter-American Court decision to date, the Petruzzi case is critical
to any analysis of the legality of the 2003 amendments and the conduct of the retrials. Although,
Peru has adopted a new constitution and its laws prohibit the prosecution of civilians in military
courts, much of what the Petruzzi court said and did is very siginificant in evaluating the current
state of the law and governmental practices in combating terrorism. 314 The analysis that follows
will examine each of the Petruzzi court's rulings against the changes that were made in the law
by the 2003 amendments. These changes in the law govern the retrials of persons previously
convicted as terrorists.
i.

Article 7(5): The Right to Personal Liberty

First, regarding the right to personal liberty, under Article 7(5) of the Convention,
Petruzzi’s right to personal liberty was violated when he was arrested, searched and detained
without being formally charged with a crime. 315 Article 7(5) provides that “[a]ny person
detained shall be brought promptly before a judge or other officer authorized by law to exercise
judicial power and shall be entitled to trial within a reasonable time or to be released without
prejudice to the continuation of the proceedings.”316 His [or her] release may be subject to
guarantees to assure his [or her] appearance for trial. ” 317 The constitution currently provides for a
prompt judicial presentment of a detained person. 318 The constitution also prohibits pre-trial
detention, unless an order of detention is given by an investigatory judge. 319 Further factual
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investigation is necessary to determine whether Peru complies in this regard with its own
constitution and the Convention. 320
ii.

Article 8: Judicial Guarantees and Due Process

Second, regarding the right to judicial guarantees and due process, under Article 8 of the
Convention, Petruzzi’s rights were violated when he was not properly prosecuted within a
reasonable time by a competent, independent and impartial tribunal, or informed of the charges
against him. He was also denied the right to an attorney of his own choosing and to confront and
examine witnesses. 321 Although, the new constitution provides for an independent judiciary, as
an institution the judiciary has not changed considerably. 322 It still suffers from eight years
(1992 to 2000) of “intensive manipulation by the executive branch of the Fujimori
administration.”323 Many of the judges are the same.
When the Constitutional Court declared some provisions of the anti-terrorism laws to be
unconstitutional, approximately 900 persons, who were initially convicted of terrorism in hooded
military tribunals, became eligible to receive new trials in civilian criminal courts. 324 Pursuant to
the constitution, President Toledo decreed a new law that created procedures for these new
trials. 325 One of the most troubling aspects of the new law is that it allows evidence, which had
been elicited unlawfully in the former trial proceedings, to be used again in the new trials. 326
The use of such unreliable and untested evidence has and will continue to frustrate the right of
the accused to be tried by a competent, independent and impartial tribunal, since that evidence is
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primed to convict. 327 A trial under such circumstances is a trial in name only. Because Peru had
blatantly violated its own laws and international standards of due process, Peru should be barred
from retrying these individua ls. A State that now claims to adhere to the rule of law should not
be given a second chance to convict those who were previously stripped of every aspect of their
humanity by that State. Principles of equity, estoppel, and double jeopardy should shut the doors
on Peru’s attempt to reconvict.
2.

The Tamayo Case

On February 6, 1993, officers of the National Counter-Terrorism Bureau, DINCOTE, of
the Peruvian National Police, arrested Maria Elena Loayza-Tamayo, a Peruvian citizen and a
professor at the Universidad San Martin de Peres, and her relative, Ladislao Alberto HuamanLoayza, at her residence in Lima. 328 Under Peru's Repentance Law, Ley de Arrepentimiento,
enacted by Decree-Law No. 25.499, a captured criminal, Angelica Torres-Garcia, denounced
Tamayo, leading to her eventual arrest. 329 The Peruvian authorities failed to follow their own
truth verification procedures and arrested Tamayo just one day after hearing Garcia's story
without first obtaining an arrest warrant. 330 The authorities believed that Tamayo was a
collaborator of the Shining Path. 331
From February 6 to 26, 1993, DINCOTE detained Tamayo without taking her before the
Special Naval Court, in violation of Article 12(c) of Decree-Law No. 25.475, detailing
procedures when the State charges a person with the crime of terrorism. 332 She was held without
any communication with the outside world and was subjected to torture, cruel, unusual and
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degrading treatment. 333 As part of their efforts to force Tomayo to incriminate herself and to
admit that she was, in fact, a member of the Shining Path, DINCOTE inflicted torture and
threatened to rape and drown her on a nearby beach. 334 Despite such efforts to force her to admit
her involvement with the Shining Path, Tamayo maintained her innocence, without qualification;
she even criticized the beliefs and practices of that group. 335 She was allowed no contact with
her family or her attorney. 336 Because of the unusual circumstances surrounding her arrest,
neither her family nor her attorney had any knowledge that she had been arrested in the first
place. 337 In fact, her family only found out about her arrest when they received an anonymous
telephone call on February 8, 1993. 338 Despite her family’s and lawyer's best efforts, Tamayo
was denied judicial review of her arrest, since Decree Law No. 25.659 prohibit ed the filing of a
petition for a writ of habeas corpus when the detention is connected to the crime of terrorism. 339
Ten days after her arrest, the authorities decided to exhibit her to the outside world via the
press. 340 DINCOTE paraded Tamayo in front of the press dressed in prison garb and publicly
accused her of treason even before it obtained proper authority to arrest or charge her with this
crime. 341 She was then taken to the former Army Veterinary Hospital, which was later converted
to a holding station, and remained there from February 26 to March 3, when she was transferred
to the Chorrillos Women's Maximum Security Prison. 342
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Although she was arrested on February 6, 1993, DINCOTE opened a police report on
February 25, 1993, charging her with the crime of treason on the same day. 343 On February 26,
1993, Tamayo was prosecuted in a military tribunal on the charge of treason. The proceedings
were held before the Special Military Court, a tribunal composed of faceless military judges. 344
On March 5, 1993, the Special Naval Court acquitted Tamayo of the charge of treason.
However, on April, 2, 1993, her case was remanded to civil criminal court, where she was
charged with the crime of terrorism. 345 On August 11, 1993, the Special Tribunal of the
Supreme Council of Military Justice rejected a state appeal of her acquittal. 346 However, the
Supreme Council ordered the case file to be remitted to the civil courts, so that she could be tried
for the crime of terrorism. 347 Thereafter, an Assistant Special Attorney General filed a petition
for special review of her acquittal with the Full Chamber of the Special Supreme Military
Tribunal, which upheld her acquittal on September 24, 1993. 348 Despite her acquittal, Tamayo
remained in detention until October 8, 1993. 349 On that day, the Forty-third Criminal Court of
Lima tried Tamayo for the crime of terrorism. 350 Ms. Tamayo opposed the charge on res
judicata and the principle of non bis in idem. 351 On October 10, 1993, a faceless Special
Tribunal of the Civil Courts dismissed her objection, found her guilty and sentenced her to a
twenty-year prison term. 352
Her case eventually went before the IACHR. Among its general determinations about the
Peruvian government’s treatment of Ms. Tamayo, the IACHR focused on the fact that the
343

Id. at ¶ 3 (e).
Id.
345
Tamayo, at ¶ 3 (e).
346
Id.
347
Id.
348
Id.
349
Id. at ¶ 3 (g).
350
Id.
351
Tamayo, at ¶ 3(g).
344

53

military court system in Peru followed a practice of denying a person accused of treason to
choose his or her own independent defense attorney. 353 The Court determined that Peru did not
allow Tamayo access to an attorney of her own choosing in the military court trial. 354
Additionally, the IAC HR found that while Tamayo was eventually given an opportunity to
choose her own attorney in the civilian criminal trial, her attorney was not permitted to freely
access the case file. 355 The IACHR further held that Peru’s conduct violated her right to
effective assistance of counsel and right to present a defense, since her lawyer was not allowed
access the file and to prepare a proper defense in light of the information that was contained in
the case file. 356 The IACHR also found that the Peruvian government unlawfully confined her
continuously before, during and after trial proceedings had taken place. 357 She was detained for
ten days before she was ever charged with any offense, during the term of the military trial, and
during her civil criminal trial. 358 Additionally the IACHR determined that she was “housed in a
tiny cell block, without natural light, [where she] is [only] allowed an hour’s sunlight each day,”
held in continuous isolation, and subjected to highly restrictive visits including her own
family. 359 The IACHR also determined, based upon the testimony of other prisoners in Peru, that
while Tamayo was detained there was a widespread practice of inhumane and degrading
treatment during the criminal investigation phase of those accused of treason and terrorism. 360
The Report of the National Coordinator of Human Rights, which had examined the Peruvian
prison system, concluded that between January 1993 and September 1994, persons imprisoned in
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Peru were victims of torture, cruel, inhumane and degrading treatment. 361 The Court made the
following findings.
a.

Violation of Article 5: Right to Humane Treatment

The IACHR unanimously decided that Peru violated Tamayo's right to humane treatment
while incarcerated, in contravention of Article 5 of the Convention. 362 A prisoner is entitled to
physical and psychological integrity. Violations of this right may include torture and other types
of humiliation, or cruel, inhumane or degrading treatment with varying degrees of physical or
psychological effects. 363 The European Court of Human Rights has declared that even in the
absence of physical harm, psychological ploys during interrogation may amount to inhumane
treatment. 364 The Court observed that in assessing whether a certain treatment, especially in a
prison setting, is inhumane or degrading, it looks for the presence of fear, anxiety and
humiliation that breaks the arrestee’s physical and moral resistance. 365 It concluded that the use
of "any force that is not strictly necessary to ensure proper behavior on the part of the detainee…
constitutes an assault on the dignity of the person in violation of Article 5 of the American
Convention."366 The Court was aware that the Commission had previously investigated and
rejected her claim that she had been raped while she was detained. The court records and the file
of her detention did not sustain this accusation. 367 However, the Commission did find that she
was clearly a victim of inhumane treatment. 368 In support, the Commission pointed to the fact
that she was subjected to extended periods of isolated detention and afforded no communication
whatsoever with the outside world. Her solitary confinement was in a tiny cell giving her no
361
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natural light. She was also subjected to physical violence, including blows, maltreatment, and
immersion in water; intimidation; and threats of future violence. Her visiting schedule was
severely restricted, and she was paraded before the media in prison garb. The IACHR concluded
that Ms. Tomayo was a victim of inhumane treatment under Article 5 (2) of the Convention. 369
b.

Violation of Article 8: Right of Due Process of Law

The IACHR found, in a unanimous decision, that Peru violated Ms. Tamayo's
fundamental due process rights, under Article 8 of the American Convention on Human
Rights. 370 Specifically, Peru violated Article 8(1), the right to a hearing by an independent and
impartial tribunal; Article 8(2), the right to be presumed innocent and the right to full equality
under the law during the proceedings; Article 8(2)(d), the right to defend oneself, and Article
8(2)(g), the right not to be compelled to be a witness against herself, not to be subjected to
coercion of any kind, and the right not to be subjected to double jeopardy. 371 The Court reasoned
that the military court had violated her due process rights because it lacked jurisdiction to keep
her in detention after she was acquitted. It also lacked authority to order that she be charged with
terrorism in a civilian criminal court which necessitated her continued incarceration. 372 Second,
in both the military and civilian trials, her fundamental rights were severely restricted. 373 She
was denied the presumption of innocence. 374 Moreover, she was not allowed to examine or
challenge the evidence that was used against he r, either before or during the trial. 375
Additionally, Tamayo's "defense attorney's power was curtailed in that he could not

368

Id.
Tamayo, at ¶ 58.
370
Id. at ¶ 85 (3) (citing The American Commission on Human Rights, at art. 8).
371
Id. (citing The American Commission on Human Rights, at art. 8 ¶ 1, art. 2, art. 2 ¶ d, art. 8 ¶ 21(d), art. 8 ¶ 21(g),
art. 3).
372
Id.
373
Id. at ¶ 62.
374
Id.
375
Tamayo, at ¶ 62.
369

56

communicate freely with his client or intervene in all [the] stages of the proceedings in full
possession of the facts."376 The civilian trial was tainted by the use of evidence from the military
trial. 377 Not only did the military court lack jurisdiction to order the remand of the case to the
civil court in the first place, the civil court erroneously relied on the evidence that was produced
in the military trial. 378
According to Article 8(4) of the Convention, "[a]n accused person acquitted by a
nonappealable judgment shall not be subjected to a new trial for the same cause."379 The Court
determined that Tamayo was tried in a military court for the crime of treason, a closely related
crime to the crime of terrorism. 380 Thereafter, the Special Naval Court acquitted her, and that
was a nonappealable decision. 381 However, Tamayo was not released from her detention. 382
Instead, the Special Naval Court remanded the case to a civilian court, with direction that she be
charged with the crime of terrorism. 383 Consequently, the IACHR held that Peru violated Article
8(4) of the American Convention when it tried and acquitted her of treason in the military court
and then tried her for the crime of terrorism in a civil criminal court. This amounted to double
jeopardy in violation of her due process rights. 384
c.

Violation of Article 51: Refusing to Comply with the Commission’s
Recommendations

The IACHR further decided that Peru "violated Article 51(2) of the Convention by
refusing to comply with the recommendations made by the Commission."385 Under Article 31(1)
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of the Vienna Convention, if a State signs and ratifies an international treaty, especially when the
treaty involves some aspect of human rights, the State is obligated to make every possible effort
to comply with the recommendations of a protective organization, such as the Organization of
American States, which is dedicated to the promotion, observance and defense of human
rights. 386
By a vote of six to one, the Inter-American Court ordered Peru to release Maria Elena
Loayza-Tamayo within a reasonable period of time according to the terms stated in paragraph 84
of its judgment. 387 Additionally, by a unanimous vote, the IACHR ordered Peru to pay fair
compensation to Tamayo and to her next-of-kin and to reimburse them for all their expenses. 388
As a significant human rights case, the Tamayo decision remains timely and relevant
despite Peru's 2003 legislation and its decision to grant retrials. The analysis that follows will
examine each of Tamayo’s rulings in light of the changes made in the law in 2003.
i.

Article 5: Right to Humane Treatment

The Inter-American Court determined in the Tamayo case that Peru had violated the
claimant’s right to humane treatment in contravention of Article 5 of the Convention. 389 With
the advent of a new constitution, including a prohibition against the use of military courts to try
civilians, Peru has made structural changes it the law, 390 however, these formal changes do not
necessarily put an end to the types of rights violations that were criticized in the Tamayo case. 391
The new constitution requires “a written judicial warrant for an arrest unless the perpetrator of a
crime is caught in the act.” 392 The new laws specify that judges alone may authorize the
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detentions of individuals. 393 Despite these changes in the law, the potential for human rights
abuse remains. 394 For example, according to the Organic Law of the National Police, the police
are allowed to detain a person for any investigative purpose. 395 Generally, the arraignment of an
arrested person must be held within twenty-four hours of his or her arrest. 396 However, when
terrorism, drug trafficking, espionage or treason is the crimes charged, the arraignment period,
including detention, is significantly longer, namely thirty days. 397 Under the new provisions,
"Military authorities must turn over persons they detain to the police within 24 hours; in remote
areas, this must be accomplished as soon as practicable."398 Congress has also passed a series of
laws to curb the problem of arbitrary detentions with the hope of enhancing the security of the
detainee. 399 However well meaning these legal provisions are for the protection of the rights of
the accused, one must be mindful that the enforcement of these rights is in the hands of some of
the very judges who, in years past, actively violated procedural due process of detainees. Police
abuse of detainees continue s to be a problem. While reports of abuse of detainees have declined
since the new constitution and laws were enacted, some abuses have remained. 400 Past practices
of abuse generally occurred immedia tely after the arrest process. It logically follows that a
thirty-day detention delay before an arraignment may invite the reoccurrence of the former
abuses. 401
ii.

Article 8: Right to a Fair Trial
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According to the Inter-American Court, Peru violated Ms. Tamayo's right to due process
of law in violation of Article 8 of the Convention. 402 Given the changes to Peru’s legal system, it
might appear at first blush that there is no longer a need to worry about future due process
violations in Peru. The cont rary is true and similar problems linger on. 403 For example, in the
past few years, Peru dismissed almost two hundred police officers and other government officials
because of poor performance, alleged criminal activity and corrupt practices. 404 However,
shortly after their dismissal, the courts compelled the reinstatement of most of the dismissed
officers finding "that dismissal following previous administrative punishment constituted a form
of double jeopardy."405 Ironically, Peru extends double jeopardy protection to the abusers but
not to those who had been severely abused at the hands of these “law enforcement” personnel.
3.

The Barrios Altos Case

Government agents had assassinated fifteen persons and injured four others who were
suspected of plotting against the government.
agents who were involved in the massacre.

406

407

Subsequently, Peru granted amnesty to the

As a consequence, the victims and the victims’

families filed a complaint with the Inter-American Commission alleging that Peru had violated
numerous articles of the Convention which it had signed and ratified on January 21, 1981.

408

The evidence demonstrates that on November 3, 1991, six heavily armed persons arrived
in two police style vehicles and entered a building located in Barrios Altos in Lima; they ranged
in age from 25 to 30 years. Their faces were covered in an effort to hide their identity.
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“militants” ordered everyone in the house to lie on the floor. 410 The terrified individuals who
were inside complied with their demands. 411 The militants then began to savagely shoot the
individuals in their heads and backs; the carnage lasted for about two minutes. 412 At the end,
fifteen persons were dead and four were seriously wounded. 413
Subsequently, judicial investigations revealed that those who carried out the massacre
had worked for military intelligence as members of the Peruvian Army and acted on behalf of the
death squadron known as the “Colina Group”. This group carried out their own anti-terrorist
program in reprisal against alleged members of Sendero Luminoso (Shining Path). 414 According
to Congressman Javier Diez Canseco, an intelligence document which was presented to the press
indicated that “terrorists” had been meeting at the home where the shooting took place. 415 Five
men were implicated in the shootings: Division General Julio Salazar Monroe (at that time head
of the National Intelligence Service (SIN)), Major Santiago Martín Rivas, and Sergeant Majors
Nelson Carbajal García, Juan Sosa Saavedra and Hugo Coral Goycochea. 416
When a judicial inquiry was initiated, it was immediately challenged by the military,
claiming that the civilian court lacked jurisdiction over an alleged crime involving military
officials. 417 Before the matter was resolved in the courts, Congress enacted Amnesty Law No.
26479, with the express purpose of granting blanket immunity and exoneration to members of
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the army, police force and other civilians who had engaged in human rights violations from1980
to 1995 and clearing them of any legal responsibility.

418

However, there was opposition to the passage and the implementation of the amnesty law
by victims and by the judge who had presided over the investigation. This judge refused to
comply with the amnesty law. 419 Consequently, Congress passed a second amnesty law, Law
No. 26492, which “was directed at [those who were] interfering with legal actions in the Barrios
Altos case.”

420

The second law declared the amnesty provision of the law could not be

disregarded by a judicial officer because the law was obligatory. 421 Moreover, Decree Law No.
26492 extended the scope of Law No. 26479, by “granting a general amnesty to all military,
police or civilian officials who might be the subject of indictments for human rights violations
committed between 1980 and 1995, even though they had not been charged.”422
The practical effect of this was to prevent civilian judges from determining the legality or
applicability of the first amnesty law and quashing any court rulings that opposed the first law. 423
On July 14, 1995, the Eleventh Criminal Chamber of the Lima Superior Court issued a decision
which held that “the Barrios Altos case should be quashed.”424 The court reasoned that “the
Amnesty Law was not contrary to the Constitution of the Republic or to international human
rights treaties.”425 Moreover, the court ordered an investigation of the judge who opposed the
amnesty law. 426 A petition was then filed with the Inter-American Commission on Human
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Rights. 427 After an extensive review of the case, on March 7, 2000, the Commission adopted
Report No. 28/00, in which the Commission ordered in part that Peru “annul any domestic,
legislative or any other measure aimed at preventing the investigation, prosecution and
punishment of those responsible for the assassinations and injuries resulting from the events
known as the “Barrios Altos operation.” 428 Specifically, the Commission ordered Peru abrogate
Amnesty Laws Nos. 26479 and 26492. 429
In opposition, on May 9, 2000, Peru forwarded its answer to the Commission, 430
explaining that the promulgation and application of the amnesty laws were “exceptional
measures” adopted against terrorist violence. It also argued that the Constitutional Court had
declared the laws constitutional431 and that civil remedies could be pursued by the next of kin of
those who had been killed and by the persons who were injured. 432 Based on the perceived
inadequacies of the response, on May 10, 2000, the Commission submitted the case to the Court
for review. 433 On June 8, 2000, the IACHR accepted jurisdiction of the Barrios Altos case to
review whether Peru had in fact violated Article 4 (right to life); 434 Article 5 (right to humane
treatment); 435 Article 1(1) (obligation to respect rights), Article 2 (domestic legal remedies);
Article 8 (right to a fair trial); Article 25 (judicial protection) and Article 13 (freedom of thought

427

Id. (discussing generally, The Inter-American Commission on Human Rights).
Id. at ¶ 17.
429
Id.
430
Altos, at ¶ 18.
431
Id. (discussing DL 26479 and DL 26492.
432
Altos, at ¶ 18.
433
Id. at ¶ 19.
434
With respect: to Placentina Marcela Chumbipuma Aguirre, Luis Alberto Díaz Astovilca, Octavio Benigno
Huamanyauri Nolazco, Luis Antonio León Borja, Filomeno León León, Máximo León León, Lucio Quispe
Huanaco, Tito Ricardo Ramírez Alberto, Teobaldo Ríos Lira, Manuel Isaías Ríos Pérez, Javier Manuel Ríos Rojas,
Alejandro Rosales Alejandro, Nelly María Rubina Arquiñigo, Odar Mender Sifuentes Nuñez and Benedicta Yanque
Churo; (discussing, The Inter-American Convention on Human Rights, at arts. 1(1), 2, 8, 25, 13).
435
With respect: to Natividad Condorcahuana Chicaña, Felipe León León, Tomás Livias Ortega and Alfonso Rodas
Alvítez (discussing, The Inter-American Convention on Human Rights, at art. 5.
428

63

and expression), as a result of the of the passage and enforcement of Amnesty Laws No. 26479
and No. 26492. 436
Peru responded immediately and withdrew “from the contentious jurisdiction of the InterAmerican Court of Human Rights.”437 However, after extensive negotiations between the Court
and Peru, Congress authorized the President to take all actions necessary to annul the previous
withdrawal from the Court’s jurisdiction. 438 Consequently, Peru initiated a settlement with the
claimants. 439 At a public hearing held on February 21, 2001, Peru officially accepted
responsibility for the assassination of the fifteen individuals and the injury of four others in the
Barrios Altos case. 440 The settlement involved six primary components. First, Peru “propos[ed]
integrated procedures for attending to the victims based on three fundamental elements: the right
to truth, the right to justice and the right to obtain fair reparation.”441 Second, Peru admitted that
“the amnesty laws... directly entailed a violation of the right of all victims to obtain not only
justice but also truth.”442 Third, the State explicitly recognized its international responsibility for
violating the right to life guarantee embodied in Article 4 of the Convention. 443 Fourth, the State
accepted international responsibility for violating of the right to humane treatment embodied in
Article 5 of the American Convention. 444 Fifth, the State recognized that it violated Article 8
(the right to a fair trial) and Article 25 (the right to judicial guarantee) of the Convention, 445
because it had “failed to conduct a thorough investigation of the facts and had not duly punished
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those responsible.”446 Finally, as a logical corollary, the State promised to investigate and
identify the assailants and to try and punish them. 447
Subsequently, the IACHR voted unanimously, on March 14, 2001, to accept the State’s
recognition of its responsibility for the brutal deaths of the fifteen persons and the injury of four
other individuals. 448 Consequently, the Court found that Peru had violated Article 4 (right to
life); 449 Article 5 (right to humane treatment); 450 Article 1(1) (obligation to respect rights);
Article 2 (domestic legal remedies); Article 8 (right to a fair trial); Article 25 (judicial
protection), as a direct result of the harm it caused to the nineteen individuals and by the
subsequent passage and enforcement of Amnesty Laws No. 26479 and No. 26492.451
On August 22, 2001 the Peruvian government made the first payment of indemnification
ordered by the Inter-American Court to each one of the survivors and the relatives of the victims
of the Barrios Altos massacre.

452

The total payment ordered by the Court was US $175,000.00

to each of the survivors and relatives of the deceased victims. 453 Moreover, in a dialogue with
the survivors and the relatives of the deceased victims, Peru accepted international responsibility
for the conduct of its agents and the violation of the right to life, personal integrity, and judicial
guarantees of each person.
4.
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The Ugarte and Rivera Case
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On February 14 and 15, 1986, Nolberto Durand Ugarte and Gabriel Pablo Ugarte Rivera
were detained by individuals who were members of the Department Against Terrorism (DAT). 455
The DAT claimed that they suspected the two of participating in acts of terrorism. 456 The two
were detained without an arrest warrant or a judicial determination of probable cause. 457 Rivera
was also forced to waive his right to a defense attorney. 458 On February 25 and 26, 1986, two
petitions for a writ of habeas corpus were filed by their relatives with the Judicial Court of
Lima. 459 The petitions demanded the protection of their physical integrity, access to defense
counsel and their release from confinement. 460
On June 18, 1986, three separate uprisings took place throughout the prison system in
Lima. 461 One occurred at El Frontón where Nolberto Durand Ugarte and Gabriel Pablo Ugarte
Rivera were imprisoned. 462 Some of the prisoners gained access to weapons and took
hostages. 463 The Peruvian government responded by ordering the military to subdue the rioting
prisoners; however, the military applied excessive and disproportionate force to accomplish this
task by crushing a wall, invading the prison, and killing or wounding a great number prisoners. 464
Later, only seven of ninety-seven bodies were identified. 465 Nolberto Durand Ugarte and Gabriel
Pablo Ugarte Rivera were probably killed and their bodies were never identified.
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On June 26, 1986, relatives of the two filed a habeas corpus petition with the Judicial
Court of Callao, pleading for an investigation as to the whereabouts of the two individuals after
the army’s intervention in the riots. 467 Although the Supreme Court did not expressly suspend
the privilege of habeas corpus during the emergency, nonetheless it prohibited civilians from
investigating claims arising out of the suppression of the prison uprising because civilians were
not allowed in restricted military zones. 468 Ultimately, Ugarte and Rivera were absolved of any
responsibility in the prison uprising and were ordered released from prison. However the order
had no practical effect because they were missing and most likely dead. 469
On April 27, 1987, the Commission received a complaint alleging various violations on
behalf of Ugarte and Rivera. 470 Specifically, the complaint alleged that Peru violated Article 1
(obligation to respect rights); Article 2 (domestic legal effects); Article 4 (right to life); Article
7(6) (right to personal freedom); Article 8(1) (judicial guarantees); Article 25(1) (judicial
protection); and Article 27(2) (suspension of guarantees), all to the detriment of Ugarte and
Rivera. 471 On September 29, 1989, Peru challenged the jurisdiction of the Commission, claiming
that there was an ongoing “judicia l process before the Exclusive Military Court of Peru, pursuant
to the laws in force, [and] it must be stated that the internal jurisdiction of the State has not been
yet exhausted, so it would be convenient for the Inter-American Court of Human Rights to wait
until the closing of said cases, before taking a definitive stand on them.”472 The Commission
rejected the challenge to its jurisdiction, and Peru failed to respond to the Commission’s
rejection.
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On March 5, 1996, the Commission entered a default jud gment and approved a report
which was sent to the State. 473 In this report, the Commission declared that “the State of Peru
[was] responsible for the violations to the detriment of Gabriel Pablo Ugarte Rivera and Durand
Ugarte, of the rights to personal freedom, life, and [denying them] an effective judicial remedy as
well as judicial guarantees of due process of law that are recognized, respectively, by Articles 7,
4, 25 and 8 of the American Convention.”474 The Commission also concluded that Peru “[had]
not fulfill[ed] the obligation to respect the rights and guarantees stipulated by Article 1(1) of the
American Convention.”475
On August 8, 1996, the application was submitted to the Court. 476 The Commission
asked the Court for three remedies: punish the individuals who were responsible for the
atrocities; determine where the bodies of Ugarte and Rivera were; and “to make full moral and
material reparation and indemnification to the relatives of Nolberto Durand Ugarte and Gabriel
Pablo Ugarte for the grave dama ge [they] sustained as a result of the multiple violations of the
rights recognized in the Convention.”477
The Court recognized its responsibility to protect human rights 478 and invited Peru to
submit evidence, whether documentary, testimonial or by an expert, to fully investigate and
adjudicate the claims. 479 The Court also requested documentation regarding the charges of
terrorism against Ugarte and Rivera and documentation about the status of the habeas corpus
remedy. 480 No documentation was ever submitted by Peru. 481 On, August 4, 1999, the Court
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summoned the Commission and Peru to attend a public hearing. 482 On September 20, 1999, a
public hearing was held but Peru did not attend. 483 The Court then reviewed each Article and
examined Peru’s and the Commission’s arguments. 484
a.

Article 4(1) The Right To Life

The Court addressed Article 4(1) of the Convention which guarantees that “[e]very
person has the right to have his [or her] life respected. This right shall be protected by law and,
in general, from the moment of conception. No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his [or her]
life.”485 The Commission had concluded that the bodies of Durand Ugarte and Ugarte Rivera
were not found, and it presumed that they had died as a result of being crushed. 486 The
Commission argued that "even though the State had the right and duty to subdue the riot, its
suffocation was carried out by a disproportionate use of force […making] the State responsible
for the arbitrary deprivation of life those persons who died because of demolition of [the] San
Juan Bautista Prison and, in particular, due to the violation of the right to life to the detriment of
Durand Ugarte and Ugarte Rivera". 487 Peru responded, claiming that “t here was never
disproportionate means employed, but the execution of a preconceived scheme to subdue the
riots demanding [the use of] weapons, and members of the Navy. Operations were implemented
within the legal and conventional framework that empowers every State to defend the principle
of authority and security of its citizens.”488 It contradicted a report that was issued by an official
Investigating Commission, created by the Congress, which had concluded that “it is proven that
the government [was] not fulfilling its obligation to protect human life, gave orders which
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brought about the consequences of an unjustified toll [and the use of] military force was
disproportionate in relation to the existing danger.”489
The Court recognized that the State has a right to defend itself in case of a prison riot,
however, the Court also determined that the State cannot use this power in a limitless way or
utilize whatever means it chooses to justify the end. 490 The facts argued by Peru “are far from
constituting [...] sufficient elements to justify the amount of force used in this and in other rioted
prisons.”491 Consequently, the Court concluded that the disproportionate use of force, coupled
with the fact that for fourteen years Peru could not account for the whereabouts of the bodies of
Ugarte and Rivera, demonstrated that Peru had violated the right to life of Ugarte and Rivera, as
guaranteed by Article 4(1) of the Convention. 492
b.

Article 5(2) Right To Humane Treatment

The Commission argued that Peru was unquestionably responsible for the disappearances
of Ugarte and Rivera, since they were in the prison during the time of the rioting. From that it
concluded that the State was guilty of depriving them of bodily integrity and depriving them of
humane treatment under Article 5(2) of the Convention. 493 The Court noted that Peru “did not
expressly refer to Article 5(2) of the Convention, but instead claimed that “under all
circumstances life and physical integrity of the inmates who surrendered during and after the
riots were respected.”494 The Court observed that the two individuals were in state custody and
that Peru refused to identify their bodies. 495 However, in the absence of proof of inhumane
treatment, the Court could not find a violation of Article 5(2). A violation under Article 5(2)
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cannot be inferred from a finding that Peru denied them the right to life.496 Consequently, the
Court concluded that the Commission had failed to prove that Peru had violated Article 5(2) of
the Convention. 497
c.

Articles 7(1) and 7(5) Right To Personal Freedom

Article 7(1) of the Convent ion guarantees “the right to personal liberty and security.”
Liberty Article 7(5) guarantees that “[a]ny person detained shall be brought promptly before a
judge or other officer authorized by law to exercise judicial power and shall be entitled to trial
within a reasonable time or to be released without prejudice to the continuation of the
proceedings, [however, this] release may be subject to guarantees to assure his [or her]
appearance for trial.”498 The Commission argued that since Ugarte and Rivera were detained by
members of the Department Against Terrorism without an arrest warrant or judicial process, Peru
had violated Article 7 of the Convention. 499 Peru did not respond directly to this allegation but
instead argued that the “investigation involved intelligence work, including a follow- up to
discover other terrorists and to identify higher-ranking persons within the terrorist
organizations.”500
The Court concluded that Ugarte and Rivera were held against the ir will by members
loyal to the dictatorship without a warrant or judicial process. 501 Consequentially, the Court held
that the State had violated the Articles 7(1) and 7(5) of the Convention. 502
d.

Articles 7(6) and 25(1), Judicial Protection
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The Court read Article 7(6) of the Convention to provide that “[a]nyone who is deprived
of his [or her] liberty shall be entitled to recourse to a competent court, in order that the court
may decide without delay on the lawfulness of his [or her] arrest or detention and order his [or
her] release if the arrest or detention is unlawful. In States Parties, whose laws provide that
anyone who believes himself [or herself] to be threatened with deprivation of his [her] liberty is
entitled to recourse to a competent court that it may decide on the lawfulness of suc h threat, this
remedy may not be restricted or abolished. The interested party or another person on his [or her]
behalf is entitled to seek these remedies.”503 The Court also read Article 25(1) of the Convention
to guarantee that “[e]veryone has the right to simple and prompt recourse, or any other effective
recourse, to a competent court or tribunal for protection against acts that violate his [or her]
fundamental rights recognized by the constitution or laws of the state concerned or by this
Convention, even though such violation may have been committed by persons acting in the
course of their official duties.”504
The Commission argued that the Court had previously interpreted Article 25 of the
Convention to require, inter alia, “a simple and prompt recourse or any other effective recourse
for the protection of the fundamental rights of the person”, including the writ of habeas corpus to
challenge the legality of that person’s detention. 505 Moreover, the Commission argued that for
recourse to be effective , the Court must give it full meaning, claiming that “Peruvian tribunals
disregarded their obligation to inform [of the] victims' whereabouts, which was the fundamental
objective…[of] the remedy.”506 In response, Peru argued that the remedy of habeas corpus
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could not be claimed here because it had lawful justification and legal authority to detain
them. 507
In weighing the two arguments, the Court held that the habeas corpus remedy provided
in Article 7(6) of the Convention “is not only valid under normal circumstances, but also under
[the] particular circumstance… [here] [because] habeas corpus represents the best means to
assure respect for the rights of life and humane treatment, to prevent his disappearance and
determine his place of detention, as well as to protect someone against cruel, inhumane, or
degrading punishment or treatment.”508 Consequently, the Court concluded that Peru had
violated Articles 7(6) and 25(1) of the Convention here. 509
e.

Articles 8(1) and 25(1) Due Process

The Commission argued that Ugarte was denied the right to an attorney and the right to a
fair trial, 510 claiming that the military tribunal was not an independent, impartial, or competent
judicial body. 511 Peru submitted a very brief reply claiming that the Commission’s argument
lacked evidentiary basis as to each finding. 512
The Court agreed with the Commission that civilians must not be tried in military
tribunals. 513 Moreover, the Court reiterated what the Commission had found, namely, that the
“exclusive military court does not offer the minimal guarantees of independence and impartiality
as stipulated in Article 8(1) of the Convention. ”514
f.

Articles 1(1) and 2 - Obligation to Respect Rights and Domestic Legal
Effects
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The Court read Article 1(1) of the Convention to require a State to “ensure to all persons
subject to its jurisdiction the free and full exercise of rights and freedoms, without any
discrimination on the basis of race, color, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion,
national or social origin, econo mic status, birth, or any other social condition.”515 Article 2 of
the Convention, according to the Court, states that “where the exercise of any of the rights or
freedoms referred to in Article 1 is not already ensured by legislative or other provisions, the
States Parties must undertake to adopt, in accordance with their constitutional processes and the
provisions of this Convention, such legislative or other measures as may be necessary to give
effect to those rights or freedoms.”516
The Commission argued that the Convention places an affirmative duty on a State “to
take action in order to ensure every person a full enjoyment and exercise of said rights…”517
The State is under a duty to adopt new measures and to revoke any laws which are incompatible
with the Convention. 518 The Court agreed with the Commission and observed that if “Peru keeps
Executive Order No. 23.201 (Organic Law of Military Justice) [as part of] its legislation, which
contradicts the rights guaranteed in Articles 8 and 25 of the Convention, [it] similarly violates its
obligations according to Article 2”. 519 Peru justified its conduct, claiming that it acted lawfully
to maintain public order and advance the welfare of its citizens. 520
The Court concluded that as a member State, Peru had to introduce changes in its national
law to ensure her compliance with the obligations that she had assumed. 521 In this case Peru had
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violated Articles 4(1), 7(1), 7(5), 7(6), 8(1) and 25(1) of the Convention. 522 Moreover, the Court
concluded that Peru did not comply with the general mandates of Articles 1(1) and 2 of the
Convention. 523
g.

Enforcement of Article 63(1)

Article 63(1) of the Convention provides for remedies for violations under the
Convention. 524 The Commission argued that Peru must punish those individuals who were
responsible for the use of excessive force, inform the relatives of Ugarte and Rivera of the
whereabouts of their bodies, and compensate the victims’ families for the pain that they had
suffered and the costs of pursuing their claims.525 The Court agreed with the Commission and
ordered Peru to investigate the facts “even if it is not an easy task.”526 It also included the
payment of fair compensation for the loss of life and legal expenses incurred by the relatives. 527
On November 26, 2001, the Peruvian government and the relatives of victims signed an
agreement of compensation. 528 The agreement included public acknowledgement by Peru that it
violated the rights of Ugarte and Rivera to life, personal freedom, and judicial protection. 529 In
addition, the agreement obligated Peru to actively conduct an investigation and to sanction those
individuals who were responsible for the various violations and to ascertain the whereabouts of
the bodies of Ugarte and Rivera. 530
V.
PERU’S ANTI-TERRORISM LAWS AND PRACTICES : INTERNATIONAL
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LAW STANDARDS AND COMPARATIVE LAW ANALYSIS
In this section, the report focuses on Peru’s international human rights obligations outside
the Inter-American human rights system and provides a comparative analysis.
Subsection A surveys a number of international instruments, which we call the United
Nations model, that strive to establish a fair balance between the needs of a State to maintain
order and security and its responsibility to protect the basic human rights of its citizenry. Peru is
a party to these conventions and treaties. The tension between legitimate State security interests
and fundamental rights is a pressing issue today throughout the world. In focusing on Peru in
this report, we do not mean to suggest that she is the primary or the only violator of human rights
in the war against terrorsim. Subsection B provides a comparative analysis that uses the
European human rights system as a model. It also provides evidence of customary international
law that Peru must respect.
A.

International Law Standards - the United Nations Model
Since the events of September 11, 2001, it has become painfully clear that terrorism is a

universal problem. For those nations that adhere to the rule of law, the war against terrorism
creates serious challenges. How does the State wage battle against terrorism and still respect
human rights in that effort? This challenge is particularly evident during critical times when a
nation declares a state of emergency in its attempt to harness terrorism. International law allows
a State to declare a state of emergency under certain circumstances, however, this is not a
limitless option. The nature and scope of these unusual circumstances and the concomitant
limitations are set out in the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), which
Peru ratified on July 28, 1978. 531
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1.

The State’s Duty to Protect Against and to Combat Terrorism

Every State is under a duty to protect all those within its borders and jurisdiction. 532 A
State may not ignore known threats to those in its jurisdiction simply because they are not in its
physical custody. 533 A State is under a duty to take reasonable and appropriate measures to
protect all people. The absence of such a duty would have serio us and negative implications for
human rights. 534 This duty is especially important for the protection of women and children,
who are at a distinct disadvantage during times of armed conflict or instability. 535
2.

State of Emergency – Some General Observations

During a state of emergency, which threatens the life of a nation, a State may suspend
certain human rights. 536 However non-derogable rights may never be suspended. 537
Furthermore, any suspension must be consistent with the State’s obligation under international
law not to discriminate on the basis of race, color, sex, language, religion or social origin. 538
a.

Requirements for a Declaration of a State of Emergency

International law requires that a State adhere to strict guidelines when declaring a state of
emergency. 539 These guidelines include: (1) that there be a necessity for the declaration; (2) that
the duration for which the declaration remains in effect be specified and limited; (3) that the legal
provisions of the state of emergency be clearly defined; (4) that the declaration respect those
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rights designated as non-derogable by international standards; and (5) that the courts of the state
retain the right to review the legality of all the actions taken by the State during the state of
emergenc y. 540 When a State determines that it must declare a state of emergency, it is under a
mandatory obligation to notify other States by informing the Secretary-General of the United
Nations what, if any, human rights it intends to suspend. 541 Further, the United Nations must be
informed of the reasons for the suspension. 542 Finally, a State must indicate at a later date to the
Secretary-General when the suspension of rights will cease. 543
b.

Necessity

The United Nations has consistently warned States that a state of emergency is only to be
declared under extreme circumstances of national emergency. 544 This must be a measure of last
resort taken with the least restrictive means possible. 545 The United Nations has frequently
admonished States when such declarations are taken for insufficient reasons. 546
c.

Duration

Another critical concern of international law is the length of time of the declared
emergency. The United Nations has been critical of States that have kept the emergency in place
for periods as long as 20 and 40 years, 547 remain in states of emergency since their creation, and
other states that retain semi-permanent states of emergency. 548
d.

Precision
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The United Nations has expressed harsh criticism when a State had failed to inform it
about the specific measures that the State took to protect human rights during the declaration of
emergency. 549 The United Nations has also taken issue with a State’s assertions for the need to
declare a state of emergency, urging that such a declaration must be supported with specific
facts. 550 A State must also inform the United Nations of the specific rights that had been
derogated. Without qualification, a State has a duty to notify the United Nations and account for
its conduct. The United Nations recognizes, however, that it is the sovereign right of the State to
declare a state of emergency. 551
e.

Curative Measures

States are responsible for bringing their own laws and practices into conformity with their
obligations under international law. 552 The United Nations has recognized that curative
measures are essential to promote and protect basic human rights. 553 As to non-derogable rights,
the United Nations has insisted that these rights be enumerated in the constitution of every
State. 554 It has also cautioned a State when its constitution or laws fall short of its obligations. 555
States have been cautioned by the United Nations when they take actions that are in direct
contravention of their human rights responsibilities. 556
f.

Judicial Control
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The United Nations model recognizes the significance of an independent judiciary. 557
This is especially true during a state of emergency. The judiciary must be free to review the
legality of the laws and of governmental conduct that disrespect human rights. 558 The United
Nations has declared that it is the duty of an independent judicia ry to examine whether a
declaration creating a state of emergency is legitimate under the circumstances. 559 The judiciary
is also to act as a monitor of governmental human rights abuses during a state of emergency. 560
3.

Non-Derogable Rights

The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) and the Optional
Protocol to the ICCPR (CCPROP1), entered into force on March 23, 1976, protect certain nonderogable rights. 561 Peru has ratified both instruments. The ICCPROP1 gives the United
Nations Human Rights Committee (HCR) authority to receive complaints regarding the violation
of the rights which are enumerated in the ICCPR from any person who is subject to the
jurisdiction of a State that signed and ratified the protocol. 562 The ICCPR requires every State
party to take necessary steps to ensure the protection of every person’s rights recognized in the
ICCPR. 563 Under Article 2 of the ICCPR, every State party must, either by current legislation,
adoption of new legislation, or through other measures, protect, ensure, and recognize the rights
that are enumerated in the ICCPR. 564 Where the State party violates these rights, it must provide
an effective remedy and enforce this remedy. 565

557

Concluding Observations of the Human Rights Committee: Colombia, at ¶ 38.
Concluding Observations of the Human Rights Committee: Sri Lanka, U.N. GAOR, Hum. Rts. Comm., ¶ 13,
U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/79/Add. 56 (1995).
559
Id.
560
Id.
561
See generally, ICCPROP1.
562
ICCPROP1, at arts. 1 & 8(2).
563
ICCPR, at arts. 2 & 6.
564
Id. at arts. 2(1) & (2).
565
Id. at art. 2(3).
558

80

a.

Right to Life

Article 6(1) states that every person has the right to life and no person “shall be arbitrarily
deprived” of this right. 566 Under Article 4(2) of the ICCPR, the right to life is a non-derogable
right, even during a state of emergency. 567 A State party can be found to not comply with its
obligation under the ICCPR when it takes no action to prevent the arbitrary deprivation of life by
its own military or police force or by non-state actors. 568 In Suarez de Guerrero v. Colombia, the
HRC found that the Colombian police had ordered the raid of Guerrero’s home on the belief that
suspected kidnappers were holding the former Ambassador of Colombia to France at this
location. 569 Upon entry and search of the home, the police failed to find the former Ambassador
or any of the suspects. 570 The police decided to hide out in the house and await the arrival of the
suspected kidnappers. 571 The HRC stated that the evidence presented established that on the
arrival of each suspect the Colombian police shot and killed the victims at point-blank without
first determining whether the y were the same persons they were looking for; that the victims
were unarmed; and that each was killed as he entered the house. 572 An investigation that was
conducted by the Office of the State Counsel of Colombia was dismissed on the basis that Article
7 of Decree No. 0070 was applicable, which provided a defense in both civil and criminal
proceedings to police action taken in the course of an operation to combat the crimes of extortion
and kidnapping. 573 The HRC held that Colombia had violated Articles 2 and 6 by failing to
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adequately protect the life of Guerrero and by providing by law a legal defense and exoneration
to the police for the acts committed during this operation. 574
Article 6(1) of the ICCPR provides that every person has an “inherent right to life.”575
This right is “protected by law,” and he or she shall not be arbitrarily deprived of that right. 576
One exception to Article 6(1) applies to States that have not abolished the death penalty; they
may impose such a sentence only for the most serious crimes, however the accused must be
afforded a right to judicial appeal or to seek a pardon, and it cannot be imposed on persons under
the age of 18. 577 Arbitrary deprivation of life can come in various forms, including arbitrary
killings, 578 abduction, 579 failure to provide for an appeal after a sentence of death, 580 failure to
provide an effective remedy, or failure to protect a person’s life while in state custody. 581 In
Rodger Chongwe v. Zambia, Chongwe, the claimant, was wounded while driving to a political
rally with Dr. Kaunda when Zambian police personnel surrounded and fired upon them. 582 The
Zambian government refused to investigate the matter, a police investigation was not completed
or made public, no criminal charges were ever initiated, and claims for compensation were
rejected. 583 The HRC stated that a State party must “take adequate measures to protect” a
person’s right to life “from threats of any kind” and provide an effective remedy when such right
has been violated. The HRC found that the evidence had established that Zambia failed to
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adequately protect Chongwe’s life or provide him with an adequate and effective remedy,
therefore Zambia was in violation of Article 6 of the ICCPR. 584
b.

Prohibition Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or
Degrading Treatment or Punishment

The prohibition against torture and other cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment is found
in two different international instruments, one is Article 7 of the ICCPR585 and the other in the
Convention Prohibition Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment (CAT). 586 Violations of either instrument can result from a State party’s failure to
prohibit or prevent such acts by legislation or other measures or when it fails to investigate
allegations of torture or other cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment by its
officials or by private actors. 587
i.

Protection Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or
Degrading Treatment under the ICCPR

Article 7 of the ICCPR states that “no one shall be subject to torture or to cruel, inhuman
or degrading treatment or punishment.”588 Under Article 4, this is a non-derogable right. 589 A
State party is required to prohibit and prevent such acts through legislation or other measures and
to provide an effective remedy for the violation of such right. 590 The HRC has found that it is a
violation of Article 7 of the ICCPR for a State party to not prevent torture or investigate an
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allegation of torture. 591 In Teofila Casafranca de Gomez v. Peru, the HRC found that the
claimant, de Gomez, was arrested, charged with terrorism, and subjected to torture by the
Peruvian police. 592 Casafranca de Gomez was physically, psychologically and mentally tortured
into giving incriminating statements. He claimed that the police bent his hands back, twisted his
arms, put a pistol in his mouth, attempted to drown him, and raped him with a candle. 593
Although the Lima Seventh Correctional Court acquitted him of all criminal charges, the
Attorney General had the acquittal annulled by a faceless Supreme Court, and he was sentenced
to 25 years. 594 The HRC further determined that even though de Gomez reported the acts of
torture and cruel treatment, no investigation was ever opened by the National Police, Department
of Human Rights, which had claimed that his complaints were not submitted in a timely
manner. 595 The HRC found that Peru’s failure to prevent and to investigate the acts of torture
was a violation of Article 7 of the ICCPR. 596
ii.

Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or
Degrading Treatment or Punishment, CAT

The Convention against Torture was entered into force on June 26, 1987. 597 Peru ratified
the Convention on August 6, 1988. Under Article 1, torture is defined as:
[A]ny act by which severe pain or suffering, whether physical or mental, is
intentionally inflicted on a person for such purposes as obtaining from him or a
third person information or a confession, punishing him for an act he or a third
person has committed or is suspected of having committed, or intimidating or
coercing him or a third person, or for any reason based on discrimination of any
kind, when such pain or suffering is inflicted by or at the instigation of or with the
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consent or acquiescence of a public official or other person acting in an official
capacity. 598
The CAT does not provide for, allow, or recognize any exception to the prevention and
prohibition of torture, including during times of war, threat of war, or any other emergency. 599
Finally, Article 15 of the Convention prohibits the evidentiary use in any proceeding of
statements that have been obtained through the use of torture. 600 Every State party to the
Convention is required to prevent torture through “effective legislation, administration, judicial,
or other measures”601 and ensure that acts of torture are treated as criminal offenses under their
laws. 602 Should an alleged violation occur, Articles 12 and 13, mandate each State party to
provide every individual who brings a claim that is based on reasonable grounds with protection
against threats and a prompt and impartial investigation into his or her allegations.603 In the
event that an allegation is established to be valid, a State party must ensure that the victim
obtains redress and an “enforceable right to a fair and adequate compensation.”604
The Committee, in Radivoje Ristic v. Yugoslavia, determined that the claimant, father of
the victim, alleged that three policemen were looking for a murder suspect when they came to his
home. 605 One of the officers hit his son with the butt of a rifle or pistol behind his left ear, killing
him instantly. 606 The officers proceeded to move his son’s body to the street where they broke
both of his thighbones in an attempt to make it look like a suicide. 607 The Committee found that
the failure of the police to immediately inform an investigating judge of the incident, oversee the
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on-site investigation in compliance with established procedures, and the failure to use a specialist
in forensic medicine amounted to an ineffective investigation. 608 Yugoslavia was held to be in
violation of Articles 12 and 13 of the CAT for the failure to provide a prompt and impartial
investigation. 609
Article 16 of the CAT prohibits all other acts that may not rise to the level of torture but
are otherwise cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment. 610 Although Article 16
specifically mentions Articles 10, 11, 12, and 13 as being applicable to Article 16 violations, the
Committee has held that this is not an exhaustive list of applicable provisions of the CAT. 611 In
Hajrizi Dzemajl et al. v. Yugoslavia, the complainants, all of Romani origin, alleged that their
homes, cattle, and belongings were destroyed by non-Romani residents in the same town. 612
This incident arose after news reported that two Romani boys had allegedly raped a non-Romani
girl. 613 The local police warned the Romani settlement that they should leave because they
would not be able to control the mob that was forming. 614 Although most of the Romani settlers
left the area, a few stayed behind to protect their homes and belongings. 615 Once the angry mob
reached the Romani settlement, they began to slaughter the cattle, set fire to homes, and
destroyed their belongings. 616 Although the local police were patrolling the settlement, they did
nothing to stop the mob. 617 The subsequent criminal investigation into the incident failed to
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produce any criminal charges or convictions, allegedly for lack of evidence, even though the
police and several hundred non-Romanis were present whe n these events took place. 618
The Committee found that the fact that some of the Romani settlers were still there when
the burning and destruction occurred and that these acts were racially motivated amounted to acts
of cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment. 619 The Committee further found that
although these acts were committed by non-State actors, the failure of the police to take
appropriate steps to stop the acts of cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment
implied State “acquiescence.”620 It was held that these acts were committed with the
acquiescence of public officials and constituted a violation of Article 16 of the CAT. The
investigation that followed this event was insufficient to satisfy the requirements of Articles 12
and 13. 621
c.

Principle of Legality (nullum crimen, nulla poena sine lege)

The internationally recognized principle of nullum crimen, nulla poena sine lege holds
that there can be no crime, unless it is first defined by law before the offense is committed.
Furthermore, the crime must be defined with sufficient precision to prevent arbitrary
enforcement. This principle is enshrined in Article 15 of the ICCPR, 622 one of the non-derogable
provisions of the ICCPR. 623 The HRC noted that a broad definition of the crime of terrorism and
of membership in a terrorist group may adversely affect the protection of rights under the nullum
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crimen provision of the ICCPR. 624 The Committee encouraged countries to define terrorism
precisely so as to not encompass “a wide range of acts of differing gravity,”625 especially when
the such offenses may be punishable with the death penalty, observing that this penalty is limited
to the most serious crimes. 626
d.

Freedom of Thought, Conscience and Belief

Article 18(1) of the ICCPR recognizes that “[e]veryone shall have the right to freedom of
thought, conscience and religion. This right shall include freedom to have or to adopt a religion
or belief of his [or her] choice, and freedom, either individually or in community with others, and
in public or private, to manifest his [or her] religion or belief in worship, observance, practice
and teaching.”627 This right is non-derogable under the ICCPR. 628 The HRC has urged member
States to expand criminal legislation to “cover offences motivated by religious hatred and [that
they] should take other steps to ensure that all persons are protected from discrimination on
account of their religious beliefs.”629 In addressing a provision in the Armenian Constitution
which allowed derogation and limitations to freedom of thought and religion during a state of
emergency, in violation of Articles 18 and 4(b) of the ICCPR, the Committee stated that the
“inconsistency of domestic law with provisions of the Covenant not only engenders legal
insecurity, but is likely to lead to violations of rights protected under the Covenant.”630
4.

Derogable Rights
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a.

Right to Liberty and Security of the Person

International human rights standards begin with a simple premise regarding preadjudicative detention of the accused. No one may be subjected to arbitrary arrest, detention or
imprisonment. 631 This is a right based on the principle of “liberty.” While the nature of liberty
may vary from state to state, international organizations have hailed it in similar forms. In the
broadest sense, everyone has the right to his or her personal liberty. 632 This is considered a
fundamental human right. 633 But this right is not absolute. The State may infringe on an
individual’s persona l liberty before, during, or after an adjudication. However, a State may only
deprive an individual of his or her liberty on valid grounds and according to lawful procedures
previously established by law. 634 It is also axiomatic that governmental action cannot be
arbitrary. 635
Times of national crisis pose particular dangers for personal liberty because each State
has a responsibility to protect its citizenry. This in turn may conflict with its duty to observe
human rights. For example, the Human Rights Committee has addressed the problem of
“preventive detention.”636 Preventive detentions may be justified on the basis of public security
or national security. 637 However, safeguards must be present to ensure the rights of those
detained. 638 The detention may not be arbitrary, and it must be based on procedures established
by law; court control of the detention must be available to the detainee; the detainee must be
631
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informed of the reason for his or her detention; and when the detention is unlawful, the detainee
should be compensated for the violation. 639 If criminal charges are eventually brought against
the detainee, he or she is entitled to the full protection of Article 9(2) and (3) as well as Article
14 of the Covenant. 640
As a general rule, individuals awaiting trial should not be held in custody. 641 Naturally,
international standards have developed a number of situational guidelines when it is appropriate
for a State to deviate from this general principle. 642 A State may impose conditions on a person’s
liberty or otherwise detain him or her while awaiting trial when the person is a risk for flight, or
he or she may interfere with witnesses or pose a serious risk to others which cannot be curtailed
by a less restrictive means. 643 International standards have stressed that the State’s judiciary has
an important role in monitoring the lawfulness of a person’s detention prior to a final
adjudication. While international standards consistently call for judicial review of detentions, it
is during times of national emergency when that review is especially critical. During a state of
emergency, the State usually exercises expanded powers to arrest and detain individuals, and
consequently, there is a greater opportunity for abuses of basic rights.
b.

Charges, Right to Be Informed of the Reasons for Arrest, and Access
to Counsel

It is essential for the arrested or detained person to have the means to challenge the
legality of the detention or arrest and to be informed of the reason for the deprivation of his or
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her liberty. Any person arrested or detained must be informed immediately of the reason. 644
Equally, the detainee’s attorney must be promptly and fully informed of any order of detention
and the reasons for the order. 645 As a corollary, the detainee must have access to an attorney at
the time of arrest and detention. Otherwise the ability of the accused to receive a fair trial and to
defend effectively will be compromised. 646 The right to the assistance of an attorney is not,
however, absolute. International standards recognize that access to counsel may be restricted or
suspended when a judicial or other lawful authority deems the restriction indispensable to
maintaining security or order. 647 However this limited exception does not give the State a free
pass; the restriction must be specified by law and cannot go on indefinitely. 648
The HRC has addressed the question of access to counsel with respect to pre-trial and
administrative detention. The Committee has expressed concern over a detention of 48 hours
without access to an attorney, even when the police suspect that “such access would lead, for
example, to interference with evidence or alerting another suspect.”649 Where less intrusive
means for achieving the same result are available, the Committee has encouraged compliance
with Article 14 of the ICCPR. 650
c.

Prolonged Pre-Trial or Administrative Detention
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It is generally accepted that the accused is entitled to a trial within a reasonable period of
time, unless he or she is released pending the trial. 651 What is “reasonable” is generally assessed
on a case by case basis. 652 Relevant factors to the inquiry include “the seriousness of the offence
alleged to have been committed; the nature and severity of the possible penalties; and the danger
that the accused will abscond if released.”653
d.

Incommunicado Detention

A prohibition on incommunicado detention serves two primary purposes. Prolonged
detention without access to the outside world can amount to cruel, inhuman, or degrading
treatment. 654 The second problem associated with incommunicado detention is that it is
conducive to torture, ill-treatment and disappearances. 655 It should be noted, however, that
solitary confinement is distinguishable from incommunicado detention. Solitary confinement
describes a prisoner who is held separately from other prisoners but is still permitted access with
those outside the prison.
A person arrested, detained or imprisoned has the right to personally, or through the
authorities, to inform his or her family of the arrest or detention and the location where he or she
is being held. 656 If the person is transferred to another place of custody, the family and friends
must again be notified. 657 Notification may be delayed if a competent authority determines that
exceptional circumstances exist which may require a reasonable delay to facilitate the
investigation. 658
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5.

Right to Political Participation and Freedom of Expression, Opinion and
Assembly

Article 25 of the ICCPR grants to each person the right to political participation. 659
These rights are derogable provided the State follows specific requirements and adheres to strict
limitations. These rights may be restricted only in certain limited situations, such as when there
is a need to “respect… the right or reputations of others” or for “the protection of national
security or of public order…, or of public health or morals.”660 In Landinelli Silva v. Uruguay,661
the HRC found that denying political rights to all citizens for a period up to fifteen years was in
violation of Article 25 of the ICCPR. 662 Although Uruguay had invoked its right to restrict
political participation during the existence of a state of emergency, the Committee found that the
restrictions were applied to everyone and failed to distinguish between those who “sought to
promote their political opinions by peaceful means or by resorting to, or advocating the use of,
violent means.”663 Uruguay’s failure to show why the restriction on all kinds of political dissent
was needed to deal with her emergency situation and its failure to pave the way back to political
freedom violated Article 25 of the ICCPR. 664
In Kim v. Republic of Korea, 665 the HRC held that a State would have to give specific
reasons why certain actions threatened its national security in order to justify its restrictions on
the freedom of expression. 666 In this case, the claimant was convicted of distributing materials

659

ICCPR, at art. 25. Specifically, this includes the right: (a) To take part in the conduct of public affairs, directly
or through freely chosen representatives; (b) To vote and to be elected at genuine periodic elections which shall be
by universal and equal suffrage and shall be held by secret ballot, guaranteeing the free expression of the will of the
electors; (c) To have access, on general terms of equality, to public service in his country. Id.
660
Id. at art. 19(3).
661
Landinelli Silva, at ¶ 8.4.
662
Id.
663
Id.
664
Id.
665
Kim v. Republic of Korea, U.N. GAOR, Human Rts. Comm., Communication No. 574/1994 (January 4, 1999),
64th Sess., ¶¶ 12.4 & 12.5, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/64/D/574/1994 (1999) [hereinafter Kim].
666
Id.

93

which appeared to voice the policies of the DPRK (North Korea), with whom the State party was
in a state of war. 667 He was convicted on a finding that he had done this with the intent of siding
with the activities of the DPRK.668 The Committee examined whether the restrictions were
warranted by a legitimate state concern, such as national security. 669 The Committee noted that
the State had failed to identify the precise nature of the alleged threat that the claimant’s exercise
of the freedom of expression posed, and that the State party had not provided specific
justifications as to why it was necessary for national security reasons to prosecute him for the
exercise of his freedom of expression. 670 The Committee found that the restriction here was a
violation of Article 19(3) of the ICCPR. 671
6.

Freedom of Movement

Article 12 of the ICCPR guarantees the right to freedom of movement. 672 Specifically, it
provides that “[e]veryone lawfully within the territory of a State shall, within that territory, have
the right to liberty of movement and freedom to choose his residence,”673 and that “[e]veryone
shall be free to leave any country, including his own.”674 These rights are derogable provided
that the State follows specific requirements and acts with strict limitations. The right to freedom
of movement may only be restricted “to protect national security, public order . . ., public health
or morals and the rights and freedoms of others.”675 In Celepli v. Sweden, the HRC found that
restrictions placed by Sweden on a person suspected of involvement in terrorist activities were
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compatible with Article 12(3) of the ICCPR. 676 In this case, the initial expulsion order of the
claimant was not enforced, and he was allowed to stay in Sweden, subject to restrictions on his
freedom of movement. 677 The Committee concluded that the reason Sweden offered to justify
the restriction of movement, in exchange for allowing him to remain in the country, was national
security, which the Committee noted is a valid reason for the derogation of the right of
movement under the ICCPR. 678
7.

Right of Accused to a Fair Trial, Presumption of Innocence, and Other
Rights

Trial proceedings must be fair. “Everyone charged with a penal offense has the right to
be presumed innocent until proved guilty according to law in a public trial at which he [or she]
has had all the guarantees necessary for his [or her] defence.”679 Further, all persons shall be
treated without discrimination and afforded equal protection before the law. 680 It is a necessary
element of human rights that the tribunal be independent. The concept of independence of the
judiciary is rooted in the democratic concept of separation of powers. 681 The judiciary’s
independence should be guaranteed by the State, established by law, and respected by all
governmental institutions. 682 A State must ensure that structural and functional protections are in
place to insulate the judiciary from political or other interference in the fair administration of
justice. 683 The judiciary is to adjudicate impartially based on evidence and in accordance with
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the law. 684 A judge should be free from any restrictions, improper influences, inducements,
pressures, threats or other interferences, direct or indirect, from any source and for any reason. 685
It follows that judges should be chosen for their legal competency rather than for political or
ideological grounds. To protect the integrity of judges, a State should establish safeguards to
facilitate the independence of the jud iciary. A State should establish a tenure program to prevent
the removal of judges based on political reactions to their decisions. 686 Regardless whether a
judge is elected or appointed, premature suspension or removal of a judge should only occur as
the result of his or her incapacity or misconduct. 687 Additionally, the State should be held liable
to pay damages for official misconduct on the part of judges, but judges should hold immunity
from civil suits for their improper acts or omissions. 688 These principles are necessary so that
judges may properly exercise their duties.
8.

Military and Other Special Courts

Civilians face special dangers to their liberty when trials are conducted by a military
tribunal or court. For example, in reference to Uzbekistan, the Human Rights Committee noted
with concern that its military courts have broad jurisdiction. 689 The jurisdiction of these courts
was not confined to criminal cases involving members of the armed forces. It also covered civil
and criminal cases when, in the opinion of the executive, and in exceptional circumstances,
normal operation of the courts of general jurisdiction were bypassed. 690 The Committee noted
that the State party had not provided information on the definition of “exceptional
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circumstances.”691 It observed that the use of military courts over civil and criminal cases
involving non- military personnel contravenes Articles 14 and 26 of the Covenant. 692 A State
party should adopt legislative measures to restrict the jurisdiction of its military courts to the
trials of members of the military who are accused of military offenses. 693 The Committee also
urged States to review their policies of trying civilians in military courts and to transfer the
accused to ordinary courts of civilian jurisdiction. 694 The Committee has also reviewed the laws
and practices of Peru, concluding that the use of military tribunals with “faceless judges”,
anonymous witnesses, and the absence of a pub lic hearing violated due process of law and the
right to a fair trial. 695 “In a system of trial by ‘faceless judges’, neither the independence nor the
impartiality of the judges is guaranteed, since the tribunal, being established ad hoc, may
comprise serving members of the armed forces.”696
9.

Right to Appeal

A necessary component of a fair trial is the right of the accused to have his or her
conviction and sentence reviewed on appeal. This becomes especially problematic when the
review is from a military or special court, which exists outside the judicial branch. 697 For the
protection of the accused, the entire criminal process must be considered as a single event. 698 A
violation of any right of the accused at any stage in the process taints the entire process. 699 The
mere existence of a higher court does not by itself satisfy the Convention. What is critical is that
691
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the court of review must have actual jurisdictional authority to take up the particular case in
question. 700 If the court of review fails to satisfy the requirements of fairness, impartiality and
independence, or does not conduct itself according to procedures previously established by law,
then the appellate review process is neither meaningful or valid. 701
B.

The European Human Rights Model
In this subsection of the report, we analyze the European model of human rights and learn

from it how it treats individuals accused of terrorism. Although the European norms do not bind
Peru directly, they are persuasive evidence of customary international law. The European
standards for the protection of human rights have been firmly established with the creation of the
European Court of Human Rights (ECHR). Beginning in 1950, the European Convention on
Human Rights laid a foundation for these protections. 702 The Court was formed in the same
year, but it did not formally begin to operate until 1959. 703 All European Union Member States
are signatories to the Convention, and all except Ireland and Norway have incorporated the
Convention into their own domestic law. Each signatory State binds itself to the principles set
forth by the Convention. The Convention allows any person to lodge a complaint against the
offending State at the European Court of Human Rights, provided the claimant first exhausts all
domestic remedies. The Convention protects a wide variety of fundamental rights. 704 The
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original principles of the Convention included the right to life, a prohibition against torture, the
right to liberty and security, a right to a fair trial, and a prohibition against punishment without
law. These standards form the basis of every Court decision. 705
One of the most basic human rights is the right to the due process of the law.
In [the] future no official shall place a man on trial upon his own unsupported
statement, or outlawed or exiled, or deprived of his standing in any other way, nor
will we proceed with force against him, or send others to do so, except by the
lawful judgment of his equals or by the law of the land. To no one will we sell, to
no one deny or delay right or justice. 706
These words were penned long before the horrors of two world wars or the events of
September 11, 2001. However, they remain meaningful today as they were in 1215, written into
the Magna Carta to denounce the feudal system and stake a claim on freedom, equality and
justice for the common man. 707 Like its predecessor, the European Convention was written in a
time of great unrest following World War II. In 1948, the year of its inception, Stalin shut down
the East, and fear pervaded the European continent. The writers of the Convention hoped to
unify a New Europe and to protect itself against dangerous ideologies. Taking the lead from the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the Convention attempted, in a sense, to codify those
ideals. Recognizing the diversity within the European community, the decisions of the ECHR
serve as a model for the rest of the international community whose current fears spring from
terrorism. 708
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The Convention, inter alia, provides clear and unambiguous standards for the rights of
the accused. The Convention in Article 6 establishes the right to a fair trial and prohibits
punishment without law. 709 Article 6 provides that the accused shall have a fair and public
hearing within a reasonable time, conducted by an independent and impartial tribunal in
accordance with the law. 710 The accused is presumed innocent until proven guilty according to
the law. 711 The accused is entitled to know the nature and the cause of his or her accusation. 712
The accused mus t be given adequate time to prepare for his or her defense, to have the assistance
of counsel and to aid in his or her defense. Counsel should be provided free of charge if
necessary to promote the interests of justice. 713 The accused has the right to examine and cross
examine all the witnesses against him or her and to present witnesses in his or her own defense.
The accused is also entitled to a have a free interpreter if the trial is conducted in a language that
he or she cannot understand. 714 In its interpretation of the Convention, the ECHR has established
convincing precedent for evaluating governmental conduct that interferes with the notion of due
process for the accused, and as such it serves as an international “role model”. 715
The European Court of Human Rights has developed a body of case law that implements
the human rights standards of the European Convention on Human Rights, reiterating many of
the rights that are recognized by various United Nations documents. All Council of Europe
member States have ratified the European Convention on Human Rights. 716 The Council’s
Committee of Ministers has also adopted comprehensive guidelines to protect human rights for

709

European Convention, at art. 6.
Id.
711
Id.
712
Id.
713
Id.
714
Id.
715
European Court: Historical Background, at ¶ 6.
716
European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms , 213 U.N.T.S. 222,
entered into force Sept. 3, 1953 [hereinafter European Convention].
710

100

states that fight terrorism. While these recommendations are not binding on European Council
member States, they are highly persuasive. In examining the European model for the protection
of human rights in the age of terrorism, the laws and practices of the United Kingdom and France
are particularly illustrative.
1.

The United Kingdom: A Brief Historical Overview of British Terrorism
Legislation

After a lull in violence between the Catholic minority and the Protestant majority in
Northern Ireland in the 1960’s, the Irish Republican Army (“IRA”) began an intensive and
violent campaign against the British Government beginning in 1969. 717 In response to acts of
terrorism, including bombings against police and civilian targets, the United Kingdom passed a
series of legislative measures in 1971 through 1975. These anti-terrorism laws implemented a
series of extrajudicial powers of arrest, detention and internment as a means to combat “the
longest and most violent terrorist campaign witnessed in either part of the island of Ireland.”718
In August, 1971, the United Kingdom introduced the “Special Powers Act” and inaugurated
“Operation Demetrius” by arresting 452 individuals whose names were on a list of suspected
terrorists. 719 The authorities released 104 prisoners within forty-eight hours of their arrest; the
others were placed on a prison ship called the “Maidstone”. 720 Twelve prisoners were moved to
an unidentified location for “interrogation in depth” that lasted several days. 721 This mass arrest
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only intensified the violence, and between August 9, 1971 and March 31, 1972, over 1,600
persons were charged with “terrorist type” offenses. 722
2.

Framework of the United Kingdom Legislation allowing for Extrajudicial
Deprivation of Liberty in Northern Ireland

In order to combat terrorism, Parliament passed various acts, each canceling or modifying
previous legislation, allowing for extrajudicial deprivation of liberty in three main areas: the
initial arrest for interrogation; detention for further interrogation; and internment. 723 Each
successive legislation modified these three processes. The Special Powers Act was the earliest
legislation, first passed in 1922. 724 Regulation 11, which called for detention, and Regulation 12,
which allowed for internment continued through November 1972. 725 Regulation 10, the arrest
provision, continued until August 1973. 726 Regulation 10 of the Act allowed for the arrest of a
person without a warrant. 727 To justify a warrantless arrest, a police officer had to believe that
the arrest was needed “for the preservation of the peace and the maintenance of order.”728
Although the arrest was limited to forty-eight hours, the officer could arrest without suspicion of
a specific offense, and the arrestee was usually not informed of the cause of his or her arrest.729
The purpose of the arrest was to interrogate the arrestee for his or her activities and the activities
of other individuals. 730 No bail was allowed in these forty-eight hours, and there was no court
review of the arrest. 731
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Detention under Regulation 11 required mere suspicion that the individual was acting in a
“manner prejudicial to the preservation of the peace.”732 The legislation did not place a time
limit on the detention, however it was customary to limit the detention to twenty-eight days. 733
Detention was used to gather evidence against the individual for a trial before an ordinary
criminal court. 734 While initially detained and being interrogated, the arrestee did not have to be
informed of the purpose of the detention, however, the arrestee was entitled to at least twentyfour hour notice of the charge before going to trial. 735
The Special Powers Act allowed for internment for an unlimited period of time. To
justify the internment of an individual, a senior police officer had to make a recommendation to
the Minister of Home Affairs, who then had the power to issue an internment order. 736 All
internments were reviewed by a committee comprised of one judge and two lay persons who had
the authority to make recommendations on whether the internment was proper, 737 however the
committee had no power to release the individual. Although the legislation did not mandate that
the internee appear before the committee, it was customary that he or she did in fact appear. 738
The internee was not allowed to examine witnesses and all the witnesses remained
confidential. 739 This committee reviewed the entire evidence, even if it was not admissible in
court. Pursuant to Regulation 12, 796 orders of internment were made, and 170 orders were still
upheld when the Terrorists Order cancelled the regulation in November, 1972. 740
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In March, 1972, the United Kingdom introduced Direct Rule in Northern Ireland,
suspending the Northern Ireland Parliament and empowering the Queen to legislate for the
country. 741 The Temporary Provisions Act of 1972 finally defined “terrorism” as “the use of
violence for political ends [including] any use of violence for the purpose of putting the public or
any section of the public in fear.”742 The Temporary Provisions Act ended Regulations 11(2)
and 12 (detention and internment) of the Special Powers Act. 743 In its place, the United
Kingdom allowed “interim custody” under Article 4 and “detention” under Article 5. 744 All prior
internments and detentions were converted into interim custody orders. 745 To justify both, the
police needed suspicion that the suspect committed terrorist acts or attempted to commit terrorist
acts. 746 Interim custody without formal charge was limited to twenty-eight days, but custody
could be extended by the Chief Constable. 747 During the twenty-eight days, the detainee was not
allowed to challenge the legality of his or her custody. 748 After the twenty-eight days, only an
independent commissioner could issue a detention order based on a finding that the individual
committed or attempted to commit a terrorist act. 749 The accused had to be given at least three
days written notice before appearing before the Commissioner. 750 The proceeding before the
Commissioner was private, however the accused had the right to be represented by an attorney
and was in practice allowed to examine and cross-examine witnesses. 751 The accused was
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required to answer questions. 752 The Commissioner was allowed to examine all the evidence, no
matter how it was obtained or whether it was admissible in court. 753 The accused had a right to
appeal the ruling within twenty-one days to an independent tribunal. 754
The Temporary Provisions Act was replaced with the Emergency Provisions Act in
August 1973. 755 This Act revoked Regulation 10 (the arrest for crime against the peace) from
the Special Powers Act. 756 The Emergency Provisions Act, however, retained the definition of
terrorism, the interim custody procedures and the detention orders. 757 However, a detainee was
now required to receive written notice from the commissioner at least seven days before the
hearing. 758 But most importantly, the Emergency Provision Act excluded statements of the
accused (but not of third persons ) that were obtained through torture or inhumane or degrading
treatment. 759
3.

Decisions of the European Court of Human Rights Regarding the United
Kingdom’s Anti-Terrorism Legislation
a.

Derogable Rights during National Emergencies

Article 15 of the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and
Fundamental Freedoms recognizes that:
[in] time of war or other public emergency threatening the life of the nation any
High Contracting Party may take measures derogating from its obligations under
this Convention to the extent strictly required by the exigencies of the situation,
provided that such measures are not inconsistent with its other obligations under
international law. 760
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Article 15 can be invoked only in times of war or when the very existence of the nation is
threatened. 761 Even when this occurs, it is not an unlimited right for the State to take any means
it deems necessary. 762 To justify an exception under Article 15, the State must first demonstrate
that the life of the nation was threatened. 763 The European Court of Human Rights gives
deference to the respondent State’s good faith determination that it has an emergency, and an
internationa l judge will not second- guess that determination. 764 However, the Court determines
whether the actions taken by the State have exceeded the “extent strictly required by the
exigencies.”765 The Court must look at all the evidence to make this determination. 766 In Ireland
v. United Kingdom, the Court recognized that the British government was justified in enacting
anti-terrorist legislation. 767 There was a “massive wave of violence and intimidation”, and
normal legislation was ineffective in combating terrorism. 768 Individuals were reluctant to report
the identity of the perpetrators in fear of retaliation. However, the Court strongly criticized
Regulations 10 and 11, because they did not provide any judicial or administrative remedy for
the arrestees. 769 The Court expressed sympathy for States that make strides for human rights.
The Court also observed that the United Kingdom legislation in question showed an “increasing
respect for individual liberty.”770 It noted that numerous internal commissions and studies were
conducted by the governments on its own initiative, and that the government took prompt steps
to alleviate problems and to improve compliance with human right obligations. The Court
examined the entire process, stating that “it would be unrealistic to isolate the first from the later
761
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phases.”771 Also, “[w]hen a State is struggling against a public emergency threatening the life of
the nation, it would be rendered defenceless if it were required to accomplish everything at
once.”772
b.

Definition of Terrorism

In Ireland v. United Kingdom, the Court held that the definition of what a person could be
arrested for under Regulation 10, namely “for the preservation of the peace and the maintenance
of order,”773 was too vague and violated Article 5. It was not until the promulgation of the
Emergency Provisions that Parliament defined terrorism as “the use of violence for political ends
[including] any use of violence for the purpose of putting the public or any section of the public
in fear.”774
c.

Defining Torture and Inhumane or Degrading Treatment

Torture, inhumane or degrading treatment is never allowed, even when a State declares
an emergency. 775 At various unidentified detention centers, the British Police Department
employed the “Five Techniques” in order to gain information and the identity of more than 700
IRA members. 776 These methods were authorized at the highest level of the police force and
were used from August 1971, until they were officially ended in October, 1971. 777 The Five
Techniques consisted of the following:
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?

“Wall standing” where individuals were put “spread eagle against the wall
with their fingers put high above their head against the wall, their legs spread
apart and the feet back.”778 The individual would have to stand for hours in this
position and support the entire body by fingertips. 779 Sometimes this position
was accompanied with beatings. 780

?

“Hooding” where a black or navy bag was placed over a person’s head at all
times and removed only during interrogations. 781

?

Playing a loud and continuous hissing noise. 782

?

Sleep deprivation. 783

?

Food and water deprivation. 784

In other situations, there was documented medical evidence that demonstrated bruising
that was consistent with beatings.
The European Court of Human Rights in the case of Ireland v. United Kingdom defined
torture and inhumane treatment. In order to determine whether an action is torture, inhumane or
degrading conduct, the Court must examine all the relevant circumstances involving the
individual who is subjected to such treatment. 785 Age, sex, and the phys ical health of the person,
and duration of the treatment are all relevant factors. 786 There is a fine line between torture and
inhumane treatment; the distinction is usually drawn on the degree or intensity of the treatment
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and the suffering inflicted on the person. 787 “Torture constitutes an aggravated and deliberate
form of cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.”788 It takes a very high standard
to find an action to be torture as demonstrated by the Court’s holding in Ireland v. United
Kingdom, where the use of the Five Techniques was found inhumane but not intense or cruel
enough to be torture. 789 The standard constituting inhumane treatment falls below torture. Any
intense suffering or practice of beating that leads to physical injury clearly constitutes inhumane
treatment. 790 However, intense discomfort alone may not be enough. For example, where
inmates at Ballykinler Prison were made to sit with their heads touching the floor for long
periods of time and at other times were subjected to harsh exercise, 791 this was held not to be
inhumane. 792
It is important to observe that persons in higher authority are strictly liable for the
conduct of subordinates who commit torture or inhumane and degrading treatment; “they are
under a duty to impose their will on subordinates and cannot shelter behind their inability to
ensure that it is respected.”793
d.

The Use of Evidence Obtained Through the Use of Torture , Right to
Counsel, and Restrictions on the Right to Counsel

Section 6 of the Emergency Provisions Act, passed in August, 1973, excluded all
confessions and other evidence of the accused that was obtained through the use of torture or
inhumane treatment. 794 However, this did not apply to evidence that was obtained through the

787

Ireland, 25 Eur. Ct. H.R. at 167.
Id. (emphasis added).
789
Id.
790
Id. at 170.
791
Id. at 179-180.
792
Id. at 181.
793
Ireland, 25 Eur. Ct. H.R. at 159.
794
Id. at 136.
788

109

torture of third persons. 795 The European Court did not specifically address this issue in the case
of Ireland v. The United Kingdom.
In Magee v. United Kingdom,796 Magee was arrested in 1992 in connection with an
attempted bombing of military personnel. He asked for a lawyer and was refused 797 and was
interrogated at least eight times. 798 He was “repeatedly slapped and occasionally punched in the
back of the head ... [and] a few times in the stomach.”799 He was allowed to see a physician who
substantiated the bruising and injuries. 800 Magee was told by his interrogators that if he
remained silent, but later testified in court, the court would draw adverse inferences from his
interrogation silence. However, this was never explained to him by his own attorney, since he
was still refused counsel. Finally, after six interrogation sessions, he confessed. 801 The
European Court of Human Rights did not directly confront Article Three of the Criminal
Evidence (Northern Ireland) Order 1988 which allowed the drawing of such inferences. The
Court held, however, that it was fundamentally unfair to find that a person who had been denied
the right to counsel would be expected to fully understand the consequences of his or her
silence. 802 The Court also addressed the request for the assistance of counsel. It concluded that
normally an accused has a right to the assistance of a lawyer in the initial stages of police
interrogation. This right can only be restricted for good cause. 803 Here, because the prisoner had
no access to an attorney and was virtua lly kept incommunicado (he was only allowed
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communication with a physician) while being interrogated, the authorities had violated his right
to a fair trial. 804
Another case that addressed the effect of silence at trial was Averill v. United Kingdom.805
Liam Averill was arrested and interrogated on suspicion that he was involved in a carjacking and
murder of two individuals. In custody, his requests for an attorney were refused while he was
interrogated thirty-six times over five days. He claimed to his interrogators that he was helping a
friend on his farm at the time of the murders. Fiber evidence which matched the hat and gloves
of the killer was found on Averhill. When his interrogators confronted him with this evidence,
he refused to answer their que stions. Later he alleged that he wore the hat and gloves while
working on the farm. The trial court drew a “very strong adverse inference” from Averhill’s
silence. 806
The European Court of Human Rights recognized that the right of silence is not an
absolute right. To determine whether a trial court may legitimately draw an adverse inference
from silence, the European Court looks to all the circumstances of the interrogation, including
the degree of compulsion involved, whether the detainee was allowed to discuss the case with an
attorney, whether he or she was constantly interrogated, and whether he or she was allowed
contact with the outside world. 807 The Court concluded that a conviction which was based solely
on an adverse inference that had been drawn from silence could not be sustained. 808
e.

The Process of Bringing Charges

Article 5 of the European Convention recognizes the right of each person to liberty and
security. It also establishes the safeguards for a lawful arrest “for the purpose of bringing him
804
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[or her] before the competent legal authority on reasonable suspicion of having committed an
offense or when it is reasonably considered necessary to prevent his committing an offense or
fleeing after having done so.”809 In Ireland v. United Kingdom, the Court found that the United
Kingdom did not comply with this Article because the detainee was not brought before a
competent legal authority and was interrogated about the activities of others. 810 The bringing of
the arrestee promptly before a judicial authority is mandatory in every arrest. 811 Furthermore,
under Regulation 10 of the Special Powers Act there was no requirement for the authorities to
hold the person on “suspicion” that he or she committed an offense or to prevent a crime or flight
from a crime. 812 All that was needed to justify an arrest was a determination by the authorities
that it was made to “preser[ve]… the peace and the maintenance of order.”813 This too was in
violation of Article 5. 814
Another illustrative case is Fox, Campbell and Hartley v. United Kingdom.815 Fox and
Campbell were arrested in 1986 on suspicion of terrorism. 816 They were detained for 44 hours
but never charged or brought before a judge. 817 Hartley was arrested in 1986, suspected of
involvement in a kidnapping. 818 The claimants admitted that their arrests had comported with
the laws of the UK but argued that the law fell below acceptable international human rights
standards, since there was no requirement in the law to find suspicion on the basis of
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reasonableness. 819 They claimed that the purpose of their arrests was to gather information from
them because they had been previously convicted of terrorism and were members of the Irish
Republican Army. 820
The European Court of Human Rights recognized that a State may impose tighter
restrictions on liberty in dealing with terrorism. The State may use information obtained from
secret sources, and it does not have to reveal its sources because it has the right to protect
informants. However, the Court must have some other ascertainable facts to ensure that there
was reasonableness for the arrests. 821 The fact that they were previously convicted of terrorism
was not enough. The arrests here were in violation of human rights standards because the UK
did not provide essential evidence to establish reasonableness. However, the Court did not find a
violation of Article 5§2 of the Convention. It reasoned that charges do not have to be conveyed
at the time of arrest as long as they are conveyed “promptly”, including the interrogation
phase. 822
4.

Post September 11, 2001 ATCSA Law

A new international terrorism bill was introduced in Parliament on November 13, 2001,
in reaction to the events of September 11 and was enacted as law on December 14, 2001. 823 The
law, the Anti-Terrorism, Crime and Security Act (ATCSA), addresses the detention of foreigners
in the United Kingdom and various procedures that impact on immigrant and refugee status. Part
4 of the law allows the Secretary of State to certify certain arrestees as “suspected international
terrorists and national security risks.”824 This certification is appealable, however, there is only
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one appeal and the determination of the Special Immigration Appeals Commission is final. 825
The House of Lords in the case of Home Secretary v. Rehman, allowed the Secretary of State
considerable discretion in certifying arrestees as “suspected international terrorists.”826 When a
person is certified to be a “suspected international terrorist,” he or she is then denied refugee
status under the Convention relating to the Status of Refugees. 827
There are two more cases that are pertinent. One involved eleven persons who were not
citizens of the UK, who alleged that ATCSA had violated their human rights. 828 The Special
Immigration Appeals Commission held that there was a “public emergency threatening the life
of the nation” and that the law did not violate their human rights. 829 The other alleged terrorism
case involved Lotfi Raissi, an Algerian national, who was released in February, 2002, after
spending five months in Belmarsh prison. 830 A District Court judge had ruled that there was no
evidence to substantiate the charge that he was a suspected terrorist. 831 He was arrested under an
earlier terrorism act. 832
The European Committee on the Prevention of Torture and Inhuman Degrading
Treatment or Punishment completed a site visit to UK prisons at Belmarsh, Woodhill and
Highdown in February 2002, to assess the treatment of prisoners under the Anti- Terrorism,
Crime and Security Act. 833 The Committee reported that some of the prisoners complained that
they were subjected to verbal abuse. One prisoner alleged that a prison officer had punched him
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in the stomach, and there were reports of bruises in his medical file. Although the Committee
found that the prison conditions were “adequate”, it also observed that social interaction was
lacking because prisoners were not let out of their cells. Health care, especially psychological
and psychiatric health care, needed improvement. Several of the prisoners were diagnosed with
post-traumatic stress syndrome or had a history of suicide attempts. 834
5.

Recommendations of the Committee of Ministers

The fight against terrorism calls for an intricate balance of interests. On the one hand the
State has an obligation to use its full legal arsenal to combat legitimate terrorist threats, but on
the other hand it still has an obligation to respect human rights. However, the threat of terrorism
cannot be used as a pretext for arbitrary and capricious governmental conduct by a State. As a
reaction to the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks on the United States, the Committee of
Ministers of the Council of Europe adopted guidelines intended to combat terrorism and protect
human rights. 835 Walter Schwimmer, the Secretary General of the Council of Europe declared:
“It is precisely in situations of crisis, such as those brought about by terrorism, that respect for
human rights is even more important, and that even greater vigilance is called for.”836
Some of the recommendations of the Committee of Ministers outlined in Guidelines on
Human Rights and the Fight against Terrorism are: 1. The first article requires a State to protect
everyone within its jurisdiction against terrorist acts and recognizes that this can be
accomplished while protecting human rights. 2. There is an absolute prohibition on torture,
degrading treatment or punishment. 3. Prohibition on arbitrariness: restrictions must be defined
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as precisely as possible. 4. Individuals must have the ability to challenge the lawfulness of the
State’s measures. 5. The authorities must have reasonable suspicions to justify an arrest and
must inform the arrestee of the charges against him or her. The arrestee must be brought
promptly before a judicial officer. An arrestee must be able to challenge the lawfulness of the
arrest. 6. The authorities may restrict access to counsel, to case file and to anonymous
informants, however such restrictions must be strictly proportionate to their purpose. 7. There is
an absolute prohibition on the imposition of the death penalty. Even if the domestic law of the
State allows the death penalty, it must not be carried out. 8. A prisoner convicted of terrorism
cannot be subjected to more severe restrictions than other prisoners, especially in his or her
communication with counsel. Nor can the prisoner be held in isolation. 9. Lastly, the authorities
may place freezing orders on the assets and property of individuals convicted of terrorism. 837
6.

The Experiences of France and Anti-Terrorism Laws and the European
Court of Human Rights

In 1978, France enacted the Plan Vigipirate, which is aimed at mobilizing the police and
armed forces to take necessary measures to ensure the protection and security of France. 838 In
1986, the September 9th Act was enacted to provide a definition of terrorism and the procedures
for the prosecution of alleged terrorists. 839 Under the Act, terrorism is defined as “an infraction
committed by an individual, or a group of individuals, aimed at seriously disrupting public order
through intimidation or terror.”840 Both of theses laws were enacted in response to Middle East
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terrorism. 841 France has also enacted new anti- terrorism laws post September 11, 2001. In
November, 2001 842 and September, 2002, France enacted new laws building on previous
legislation. These laws extend the maximum duration of police custody to four days, allow for
night searches, allow detainees to be held up to 72 hours without access to an attorney, allow
terrorist trials to be held by special courts, and allow alleged terrorists to receive reduced
sentences if they are repentant. 843 The September 11th inspired laws allow the prosecution of all
acts of terrorism as separate offenses, punishable with increased sentences. 844 The European
Convention on Human Rights does not prohibit a State from enacting anti-terrorism legislation,
however, these measures must not be vague or arbitrary so as to flout the rights of the accused
that are enumerated in the Convention. 845
Given France’s long and bitter battle against terrorism and the international
condemnation that it generated at times, the European Court’s decision in Tomasi v. France846 is
extremely significant. The claimant Tomasi was a Corsican born resident of France. His ordeal
began in March 1983, when he was apprehended in his shop and placed in police custody. He
was suspected of participating in an attack on the French Foreign Legion that had left one guard
wounded and another dead. Based on his affiliation with a separatist political organization and
his contributions to the political candidacy of separatist candidates, Tomasi was accused of
crimes related to terrorism. Based on the French law of 1986, Tomasi was denied a trial by jury,
because his crime was related to acts of terrorism. “Where the crime is related to an indirect or
collective undertaking aimed at seriously prejudicing public order by intimidation or terror, the
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accused must be tried before a court of assize without a jury”. 847 After his arrest Tomasi was
subjected to brutal interrogation methods. Tomasi was examined by a physician shortly after his
initial interrogation, who said that he was covered with bruises and had a dysfunctional eardrum,
possibly the result of being battered about the head. Tomasi alleged that he was made to stand
naked in front of an open window for close to 24 hours, and that he was verbally assaulted by
insults and degrading words. The most serious allegations were of prolonged detention and an
untimely trial. Ultimately, the first trial, appeal and retrial took a number of years. He was
eventually acquitted on October 22, 1988. The case before the ECHR alleged that he was held
for over one year without any judicial proceedings. He also alleged police brutality and
violations of the provisions of the Convention that guarantee the right to a fair and speedy trial.
In total, he was detained for over five years. 848
The French government defended its actions, citing as reasons the complexity of the
process of gathering evidence and the gravity of the crimes and their terrorist nature. The ECHR
ruled that the initial detention of forty-eight hours was just the beginning of the many violations
of his human rights. It determined that he was held without food or water, beaten and brutalized,
and interrogated for more then fourteen hours. The Court found that France had violated Articles
3, 5-3 and 6-1. Tomasi was awarded over 900,000FF in pecuniary damages and costs and fees
for prosecuting the proceeding. 849
The case establishes a precedent that ill-treatment of an arrestee in custody constitutes a
serious violation of Article 3, freedom from torture, inhumane treatment or humiliation while in
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custody. 850 The difference between “torture” and “inhumane treatment” is a matter of degree.851
Tomasi was a victim of purposeful and systematic humiliation and degradation at the hands of
the French police. 852 The Court was especially disgusted by the initial treatment of Mr. Tomasi.
He was singled out as a terrorist and “treated like an animal.”853
The Tomasi case has been used by the ECHR in reviewing legitimacy of other antiterrorist legislation. 854 The concern of the Court has been to find a fair balance between a
person’s fundamental rights and the interests of national security and public safety. What is
evident is tha t the State must maintain a fair, independent and impartial judicial system. The
Court will apply strict scrutiny of governmental conduct involving the detention and
interrogation of alleged terrorists. The State has the burden to demonstrate that its criminal laws
and investigatory procedures are fair and that the treatment of alleged terrorists meets the
standards of the Convention. The State has the burden of demonstrating to the Court that it did
not practice inhumane or degrading methods in the interrogation of alleged terrorists or deprive
the detainee of his or her right to the assistance of counsel. Lastly, the State must afford the
accused a civilian criminal trial within a reasonable time. 855
VI.
SOME FINAL CONCLUSIONS
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1.

We have reviewed the record and come to appreciate the many positive changes that have

taken place in Peru during difficult times. We recognize that Peru has amended the law and
instituted new procedures. In its war on terrorism, Peru had, in the past, disregarded her
obligations under the Peruvian constitution and international law. However, today, by judicial
executive and legislative measures, Peru is on her way to realize her obligations. It is a very
good start. We encourage Peru to go further in her quest to become a nation that adheres to the
rule of law.
2.

The decision of the Constitutional Court and the 2003 amendments to the law have

addressed some vexing problems. The Constitutional Court has prohibited the use of military
tribunals over civilians and limited the practice of incommunicado detention. Although the
Constitutional Court has permitted the use of incommunicado detention in the investigation of
alleged terrorist acts, the authority to allow an incommunicado detention rests exclusively with
the investigating judge, thereby adding judicial oversight to this practice. Peru should go further
and ban incommunicado detentions altogether to satisfy international due process standards.
3.

Article 2 of DL No. 26,447 replaced Article 12(c) of DL No. 25,475. An accused person

now has the right to choose any defense attorney he or she wishes, regardless whether counsel
also represents other suspected terrorism detainees. The law also allows for the presence of
defense counsel while the detainee makes a statement, rather than after the fact. This is a very
positive development.
4.

DL No. 26,671, made a very important change to the 1992 law by putting an end to

faceless military tribunals, and consequently, pursuant to DL No. 926, 2003, terrorism
convictions were annulled, and retrials were ordered per Article 2. The retrials, based on new
prosecutorial charges, are to take place in ordinary civilian criminal courts. Article 2 excludes
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from the retrials any individual who had completed his or her sentence or had been pardoned.
The changes in the law, however, did not go far enough. Because Peru had engaged in blatant
human rights violations in the past in the pursuit of convictions of alleged terrorists, including
the use of torture, it should be barred from retrying these individuals. A State that now claims to
adhere to the rule of law should not be given a second chance to convict those who were
previously stripped of every aspect of their humanity by that State. Principles of equity,
estoppel, and double jeopardy should shut the doors on Peru’s attempt to reconvict on tainted
evidence.
5.

The Constitutional Court has reaffirmed the right of the accused to the assistance of

counsel as a fundamental right under the constitution. The recognition of this right and of the
right to freely communicate with counsel is a very important step in bringing Peru into
compliance with its international obligations. There is, however, a need to investigate whether
Peru complies in practice.
6.

Peru also recognizes that the accused enjoys a presumption of innocence and the right to

a public trial. Public trials are now mandated except where demands of national security, public
order, or morality call for closed hearings. This change in the law is not enough. No civilian
criminal trial should ever be held in closed proceedings. To allow such closure is to invite
further abuses. More investigation is also needed to determine whether Peru abuses this openended and rather vague statutory exception.
7.

Currently, Peru’s judiciary has greater oversight responsibilities over the investigation,

arrest and the adjudication of a person charged with an act of terrorism and related crimes. What
remains to be a major deviation from acceptable international norms of due process is the
admissibility of tainted evidence – primarily coerced confessions – in the retrials of previously
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convicted persons accused of terrorism and related crimes. Peru must not permit the use of
confessions, admissions, and other related testimonia l statements, given by the accused or by a
third person, that are the product of torture and similar illegal police practices.
8.

Another problem is the vagueness of the term “terrorism” in the criminal law. Although

the Constitutional Court has clarified what the prosecution needs to prove in order to obtain a
valid conviction, it also directed the Congress to amend the law and to provide a clear definition
of “terrorism”. However, Congress has yet to define the term. A vague criminal statute that fails
to adequately inform an individual as to what conduct is prohibited and punishable violates
international standards of due process.
9.

There are other serious deficiencies in the current anti- terrorism laws. For example,

Decree Law 922 allows a judge to order the removal of the accused from the courtroom
proceedings during the testimony of any witness, if the judge discretionarily concludes that the
presence of the accused would adversely affect the candor of a reluctant witness who fears for
his or her safety. The Constitutional Court had recognized a limited right of exclusion in order to
protect the safety of police officer- witnesses and their families. The Constitutional Court
created a vague standard which invites further abuses. The accused should never be excused
from his or her trial. The accused must be allowed to remain throughout the trial to confront his
or her accusers and to assist counsel in the cross examination of prosecution witnesses. The
European Court of Human Rights has recognized that the right of confrontation and cross
examination is fundamental in establishing the truth of the accusation and judging the credibility
of the witnesses. Peru should do the same.
10.

Another troublesome concern is Peru’s evidence law that still allows the use of affidavits

of “repentant terrorists” as admissible evidence at trial. The verification of this evidence is made

122

solely by the Public Ministry, the very governmental entity that is responsible for the prosecution
of alleged terrorists. Since the verification is made by the prosecution, and not by an
independent and impartial judge, the law invites abuse. Although Article 8 of DL 922 calls for
the judge to use “equitable criteria” in evaluating the admissibility of such evidence, the judge is
not required to order an independent investigation into the truth of these statements. This
standard is also sufficiently vague. Article 8 of DL 922 does not go far enough. It fails to allow
the accused to independently challenge the evidence at trial. The history of using contaminated
evidence, mostly derived from terrorist suspects during police interrogation, including the use of
torture, requires that courts in Peru today deny the use of such evidence altogether, or require its
verification by an independent and impartial judge. At a minimum, the law must allow the
accused to confront the affiant accusers in person at trial and to have an opportunity to
effectively cross-examine them in open court.
11.

The Peruvian Constitution guarantees the accused the right to present a legitimate

defense. By permitting the use of contaminated uncross-examined evidence, the accused on
retrial is stripped of that right as well. International human rights standards have long recognized
that confessions which are the product of torture or inhumane treatment must not be allowed as
evidence in a criminal trial. Such evidence is inherently unreliable.
12.

Peru’s anti- terrorism laws also fail to adequately promote the prohibition against torture

and other cruel, inhumane or degrading treatment or punishment. Coerced confessions, obtained
by torture, are admissible today in the retrials of alleged terrorists. Moreover, there are no
provisions in the law for the education and dissemination of information regarding this
prohibition in the training of appropriate State personnel. One must be mindful that many
current law enforcement personnel and judicial officers were active participants in various

123

human rights abuses. They were the problem. They are not the solution. Further investigation is
needed to determine whether Peru provides adequate and prompt investigations of claims of
torture, and if these allegations are shown to be valid, whether it provides effective remedies.
13.

Peru has made substantial changes in the law since the end of the Fujimori regime. The

judiciary, President Toledo and the Congress have taken bold steps to cure human rights
violations during difficult times. Peru has demonstrated that the law is not silent in times of war.
The task for Peru is to complete the transformation process and to embrace hum rights
guarantees fully.
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